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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A trinational all-star team of curators was established.  The object was 
how to ignite a Matisse-Picasso show, pairing works by the two artists, 
conveying to the audience the long obsession the two artists had for each 
other’s works, focusing on instances where one artist surges and the 
other, consciously or not, responds.  The difficult task was to collect 
works owned by Tate in London, Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts in 
Moscow, the Columbus Museum of Art in Ohio, the Modern in Queens, 
and many other galleries and private collectors.  The seduction began 
with a card game: “Artists Dueling, Curators Dealing.”  The game was 
played between Henry Matisse and Pablo Picasso collectors and 
curators.  A curator would approach a collector with a deck of cards in 
hand. Each card showed a reproduction of a work either by Matisse or 
Picasso.  The curator would lay the cards on a table, face up, presenting 
them to the collector.  The curator would then match one card by 
Picasso, say “Nude with Raised Arms” or “Acrobat,” and one by Matisse, 
say “Blue Nude” or “Acrobats,” as if to mimic the rivalry the artists had 
in life and the dependence each had on the other’s talent. 
The curators’ interest in the game was to stimulate interest for the 
trinational show in New York, London, and Paris, in which the two 
artists’ works would face off on gallery walls.  The curators were hoping 
to convince the collectors with the uniqueness and richness of the show 
by letting them juxtapose the cards in various ways.  The curators had 
one aim: to convince collectors to part with their card—their art—for 
one calendar year.  The game was successful. The show went on.1  
Indeed, the show left no room to question the artistic collaboration and 
rivalry between Picasso and Matisse. 
Collaboration is an unavoidable character of the creative society.  The 
Matisse-Picasso collaborative paradigm is just one example.  Jeff 
 1. Sarah Boxer, Artists Dueling, Curators Dealing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, § 2, 
at 1. 
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Masten tells us that “collaboration was a prevalent mode of textual 
production in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only eventually 
displaced by the mode of singular authorship with which we are more 
familiar.”2  And Brian Vickers recently observed that collaborative 
authorship was a “standard practice in Elizabethan, Jacobean, and 
Caroline drama.”3  Does the fact that “collaborative authorship” preceded 
singular authorship mean that all subsequent authorial and artistic 
endeavours have a collaborative dimension?  Collaborative in what 
sense?  Is it only between authors in their individual capacity? 
This Article is about the invention of a concept: the “copyright 
moment.”  The “copyright moment” means recognition of the moment in 
which copyrighted entities are born.  Defining this moment will not only 
allow us to reorganize the entitlement edifice in copyright, but will also 
mark the beginning of a debate on how copyright laws and policies 
should evolve in the future. It will necessitate recognition of unrewarded 
actors taking part in the copyright making process.  Allocating rewards 
in the products resulting from the relationship between Picasso and 
Matisse will mirror the status quo: both artists won, and their relationship 
and collaboration made them better artists.  In every incident of 
collaboration, however, there is one contributor that does not normally 
win—the public.  Simply put by James Boyle: “Authors tend to win.”4
The collaboration between Picasso and Matisse was not isolated from 
the cultural and social context in which they created.  Collaboration that 
reaches artistic fruition requires the consumption of collectively 
produced and owned social and cultural properties.  The public serves as 
a platform from which social events and cultural processes emerge, are 
absorbed by individuals, and then embedded in expressions of human 
intellect.  At the core of the present Article is the argument that if one 
makes an attempt to define the collaboration between Picasso and 
Matisse and value the creative results emerging from their collaboration, 
one is required to view this collaborative act as a three-party project 
between Picasso, Matisse, and the public.  In what follows I intend to 
 2. JEFFREY MASTEN, TEXTUAL INTERCOURSE: COLLABORATION, AUTHORSHIP, AND 
SEXUALITIES IN RENAISSANCE DRAMA 4 (1997). 
 3. BRIAN VICKERS, SHAKESPEARE, CO-AUTHOR: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF FIVE 
COLLABORATIVE PLAYS 137 (2002). 
 4. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 116 (1996); cf. Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship 
and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997) (book review) (questioning the 
power of the Romantic authorship idea to explain intellectual property law). 




reject declarations supporting the view that copyright is authors’ 
territory and argue that the interdependent nature of human intellectual 
creation means that its products represent the creative collectivity: 
[G]iven the vital dependence of a person’s thoughts on the ideas of those who 
came before her, intellectual products are fundamentally social products.  Thus, 
even if one assumes that the value of these products is entirely the result of 
human labor, this value is not entirely attributable to any particular laborer . . . .5
I shall attempt to answer the following question: If copyrighted 
entities are socially constructed—actual manifestations of the collective 
creativity—ought they be collectively owned?  In one of her recent 
works, Wendy Gordon reminds us what copyright scholars argued for 
many years: that copyright norms in today’s legal environment 
undervalue the “gift[] all artists receive, namely, a tradition and world 
they have not made.”6  If Gordon is correct, and if authorial and artistic 
properties are created in a social setting which we own in common, 
should they, as Steven Wilf strongly advocates, be jointly owned 
between authors and the public?7
Parts II and III of this Article briefly present and discuss the classic 
principle of Romantic authorship from a social constructionist perspective.  
Part IV introduces into copyright discourse the principle of original 
appropriation familiar to discussions on traditional property such as land 
and chattels.  This Part argues that the original appropriation principle has a 
special significance for copyright debates.  Parts V and VI take the 
theory of social construction as their organizing principle and examine 
the public’s authorial role.  In these Parts, I defend the following 
proposition: in order to rethink the bundle of limits the law imposes on 
copyright holders we ought to realize the meaning behind the fact that 
authors and copyrighted entities are social constructs.  Part VII applies 
the findings of the preceding Parts to works created by Shakespeare, 
Picasso, Mozart, Dada artists, and photographers.  Before the concluding 
Part, Parts VIII and IX define the “copyright moment” concept and 
claim that solitary authorship, the principle dominating the evolution of 
modern copyright, is misleading and requires a radical conceptual 
change.  I shall argue that the “copyright moment,” if properly defined, has 
much to offer contemporary copyright affairs. 
 5. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 
38 (1989). 
 6. Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives 
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 77 (2004). 
 7. Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 
(1999). 
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II.  AUTHORIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 
Scholarship developing social approaches to copyright criticises the 
Romantic notion of the author and questions the property constituent in 
copyright from a social perspective.  Martha Woodmansee and Peter 
Jaszi are the pioneers who initiated the present stream of scholarship on 
social approaches to copyright.8  They convincingly argue that the 
author is deconstructed into a vessel through which many influences and 
experiences are poured.  Developing this ideal further, Boyle criticises 
the idea of Romantic authorship and its effect on the scope of copyright 
in modern times.9  He reminds us that authorial entities are “socially 
constructed and historically contingent.”10
Many scholars support, albeit sometimes not explicitly, the idea 
behind authorial constructionism: that authorial and artistic entities do 
not stand alone, and their realization requires social interaction and 
cultural exchange.  For example, Zechariah Chafee remarks that “[t]he 
world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our 
predecessors.”11  Jessica Litman argues that there is no ultimate originality.12  
Rosemary Coombe criticises the propertization of shared symbols and 
cultural elements.13  Alfred Yen remarks that “[a]ny frank appraisal of 
authorship must conclude that each author’s work contains both the 
author’s original creations and material drawn from other authors. . . .”14 
Carys Craig contends that intellectual works are necessarily the products 
of collective labour and so ought to be owned collectively.15  More 
recently, Julie Cohen reminded us of the collective dimension in 
copyright.  She emphasizes the “lack of a clear connection between the 
 8. THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 1, 9 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi 
eds., 1994). 
 9. See generally BOYLE, supra note 4. 
 10. Id. at 114. 
 11. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. 
REV. 503, 511 (1945). 
 12. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).  Litman views 
the creative act as an act dependent on the works of others, and concludes that “this is the 
essence of authorship.”  Id. at 967. 
 13. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 
99 (1998); see also Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: 
Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991). 
 14. Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, in THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 8, at 159, 166. 
 15. Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning 
Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEENS L.J. 1, 36 (2002). 




behavior of the individual user and copyright’s overarching goal of 
fostering collective ‘progress,’” and remarks that before we rethink 
modern copyright we “must take into account the mutually constitutive 
relationships between and among the self, community, and culture.”16
These examples demonstrate the fact that contemporary scholarship 
on copyright recognises the wrongs inherent in Romantic notions of 
authorship and the need to examine copyright in a social context.  
Therefore, if, as Susan Scafidi asserts, as members of a cultural unit we 
“already share the same culture and jointly ‘own’ its cultural products,”17 
should we not recognise the “unit”—in other words, the collective—as a 
contributor to the process of creating cultural products?  Antiromantic 
approaches to authorship, as Alan Durham puts it, attempt to define 
authorship as “less a manifestation of the author’s personal vision, 
created ex nihilo” but rather as a “synthesis of prior texts and cultural 
influences.”18
Although copyright scholars recognise the social construction of 
authorship, they still retain dominant stereotypes of authorship and 
authors.  Pamela Samuelson writes on Boyle’s approach: “Boyle does 
not oppose authors’ rights except to the extent that Romantic notions 
about authorship lead to inefficient or unjust legal outcomes, as 
sometimes occur when we fail to appreciate fully the sources from 
which authors draw or the contributions of audiences.”19  Indeed, Boyle 
asserts that allocation of property rights to authors has “a clear element 
of existential truth—our experience of authors, inventors, and artists 
who do transform their fields and our world, together with the belief . . . 
that the ability to remake the conditions of individual life and collective 
existence is to be cherished and rewarded.”20  Boyle’s argument is at the 
heart of the present Article.  I will not reject the idea behind authors’ 
rights, but claim that we have to fully translate the rejection of Romantic 
notions of authorship into a paradigm of ownership that takes into 
account the right of unrewarded sources, namely, the public. 
In this Article I present a model for public authorship, emphasizing 
the sociality of copyright.  I agree with Durham that “no theory of 
authorship can account for everything, or be consistent with all that 
 16. Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
347, 372 (2005). 
 17. Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
793, 810 (2001). 
 18. Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 569, 616 (2002). 
 19. Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for Enabling Metaphors for Law and Lawyering 
in the Information Age, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2029, 2055-56 (1996) (book review surveying 
BOYLE, supra note 4, and M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995)). 
 20. BOYLE, supra note 4, at 60 (emphasis omitted). 
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courts have said or lawmakers intended.”21  Also, I fully recognise the 
limits of every social approach to authorship and copyright.  At the same 
time, there is a fundamental need to constantly rethink contemporary 
systems allocating property rights for authors and artists, in order to 
maintain stable social and cultural realities.  This, as I shall argue, does 
not mean withholding rewards to authors in the form of property rights.  
As Jane Ginsburg remarks: 
[W]hether one sees copyright as a personality right conferring on the author the 
ownership of the fruits of her labor, or as an economic incentive scheme to 
promote the production of works of authorship, or as a public works 
program designed to fill the public domain (or, most accurately, as a 
combination of the three), giving credit where it is due is fully compatible 
with both the author-regarding and the public-regarding aspects of these 
goals.22
The public authorship model I introduce and defend in this Article 
combines arguments postulated, amongst others, by Woodmansee, Jaszi, 
Boyle, Coombe, and Durham. As a right-based approach, it defines the 
scope of authors’ rights and the rights of the public in copyrighted 
materials and argues for a public property right in every copyrighted entity. 
The views expressed by scholars who examine authorial constructionism 
contribute immensely to the understanding of the sociality of the creative 
act and inspired my vision of what copyright should be.  However, while 
the majority of scholars examine the “construction of authorship,”  I 
emphasise the “social construction of authorship.”  For example, as 
opposed to Woodmansee and Jaszi who define the “copyright moment” 
as collaborative in nature but emphasize the collaboration between 
authors in their individual capacity, I examine the vital and unavoidable 
collaboration between authors and the public in the collective sense, and 
highlight their mutual role in the formation of copyrighted entities.  This 
role renders every copyrighted entity a social construct and requires us 
to take account of the public’s role when we think of how to structure 
the bundle of entitlements copyright law secures for authors. 
Social constructionism, I argue, is a unique definitional tool.  My 
analysis is designed to lay the foundations for a coherent copyright 
balance which rewards all actors involved in the making of authorial and 
artistic properties.  It is designed to explore the interconnection between 
 21. Durham, supra note 18, at 642. 
 22. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and 
Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 306-07 (2004). 




copyright’s formal structure and the informal structures of social life.  I 
shall focus on copyright as a process—on the creative act as a social 
activity.  Michael Madison most poignantly puts it: 
[L]ike all law, copyright has to work out the relationship between its own 
formal structures, on the one hand, and the informal structures of social life, on 
the other, and it has to do so both in its day-to-day application and in its formal 
framing.  One way to do that it to focus, as copyright conventionally has done, 
on “authors” and “works” and markets.  I suggest that in many respects 
copyright is better understood in terms of practices and processes, that is, in 
terms of how creative things are produced as well as in terms of who does the 
producing and what is produced.23
III.  WHO AUTHORS COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS? 
Although it is not entirely wrong to argue that “[o]ur lives are in every 
respect dominated by an intuitive sense of property and belonging,”24 
when intellectual properties are at stake, ownership and control should 
not be defined under exclusive terms. Intellectual property rights in 
general, and copyright in particular, are different from rights in 
traditional properties.  The difference between intellectual property and 
other physical property can be defined by means of two main arguments 
which explain the social nature of copyrighted entities.  First, since a 
copyright work is a form of expression, there is a clear and decisive 
public role—more than in any other form of property—in shaping 
methods of expression like languages, and musical and artistic styles.  
Second, in general, copyrighted works such as literature, music, and 
films are the defining components of our culture and social reality.  
Treating them as private property essentially means that our culture and 
social reality can be owned with the perquisites of buying, selling, 
transferring, and excluding.  Not only do the expressions of our culture 
and social environment define our society as a whole, they are also part 
of what defines our individual personalities and aspirations.  Subjecting 
such elements to private property will limit the things we are exposed to 
and will have a directly detrimental effect on the development of our 
society and its members. 
The creation of a copyright work is social.  It depends on the author’s 
exposure to his culture and to other elements of the external reality that 
make him capable of realizing his innate creative ability and of 
interpreting and embodying the substance and significance of these 
elements in copyright endeavours.  These external elements are initially 
 23. Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 392 (2005). 
 24. Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, in 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS pt. 2, at 
157, 158 (M.D.A Freeman & R. Halson eds., 1994). 
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created in the public domain, they constitute an integral part of it, and 
they are the property of the public.  In this Article I claim that since 
every copyright work consists of ideas and “materials” that are the 
property of the public, authors cannot claim, and in fact are not entitled 
to, any exclusive ownership rights of the products of their creative 
labour: both society and its members labored on each creation.  While 
the individual author invests money, his subjective interpretation of the 
external reality, and his talent, the public invests the social and cultural 
capital which enables him to realize and translate his talent into the 
language of creation.  Thus, as I shall argue, both the public and the 
author deserve property rights in every copyright work.  For both, the 
principle “as you sow, so shall you reap” applies.25
This interpretation contradicts the general message behind our 
copyright law.  It rejects the view that only an individual author is a 
labourer.  The primary justification for United States copyright law is 
encouraging the creation and dissemination of expressive works that 
benefit the public.  The constitutional provision that authorizes copyright 
and patent law explains its purpose as “promot[ing] the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”26  The U.S. Supreme Court added that the main purpose of 
copyright is to “secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor” and 
by creating this incentive “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.”27  I argue that the public, in the collective sense, is a 
labourer that adds labour to every copyright creation.  Viewing the 
 25. In the historic case of Millar v. Taylor, the court advocated an author-oriented 
approach: 
[B]ecause it is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own 
ingenuity and labour.  It is just, that another should not use his name, without 
his consent.  It is fit that he should judge when to publish, or whether he ever 
will publish.  It is fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of 
publication; how many; what volume; what print.  It is fit, he should choose to 
whose care he will trust the accuracy and correctness of the impression; to 
whose honesty he will confide . . . . 
Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252 (K.B.). The court’s decision in Millar was 
reversed by the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett, where it was held that there is 
no place for natural law in copyright jurisprudence.  Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. 
Rep. 837 (H.L.) (appeal taken from K.B.); see MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE 
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 78-85 (1993). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 27. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 




public role as such begs the question—should the public be granted 
similar authorial rights that are granted to individual creators? 
Social approaches to copyright exist.  However, the significance of the 
public as copyright creator for ownership questions has rarely been 
practically recognised.  The public, we are told, should be satisfied with the 
fair use doctrine or with the availability of ideas.  Three main problems 
affect the legitimacy of this view.  First, the fair use doctrine, “the most 
troublesome in the whole law of copyright,”28 is limited in scope29 and 
views the public as secondary in importance.  Second, the distinction 
between ideas and expressions is blurred and extremely subjective.30  
Third, treating the public as an entity having an interest, rather than a 
right, in copyrighted entities is misleading and devalues the collective 
contribution to the copyright making process.  I argue that copyrighted 
entities are manifestations of the collective creativity; they are socially 
and culturally constructed.  So we may ask, if works of art and authorship 
are collectively produced, ought they be collectively owned?  Admittedly, as 
Underkuffler remarks with regard to conventional property, property is a 
legal conclusion, but the idea that property rights “are presumptively 
free from collective claims has been decisively abandoned, if ever it was 
true.”31  I largely base my arguments on the claim that every copyrighted 
entity is a collective enterprise, socially constructed and historically 
contingent.  This claim, I argue, raises serious doubts regarding declarations 
such as “I own the copyright” or “this is my copyright.” 
A starting point for the understanding of copyright from a social 
constructionist perspective is the role of collaboration in copyright 
creation and its place as a key characteristic of the creative society.  Jaszi 
tells us that in recent times works of art and authorship are increasingly 
becoming “collective, corporate, and collaborative.”32  And Greg Lastowka 
 28. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented 
Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy 
This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 
114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in 
Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1565-67 (2005). 
 30. Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression 
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 231 
(1990); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
and Copyright in a Work’s ‘Total Concept and Feel’, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 397 (1989). 
 31. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 2 (2003); see also Laura S. 
Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990). 
 32. Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 8, at 29, 38.  Bradford also 
recently remarked that “[n]etworked communication raises the potential for collaboration 
and decentralized production and thus active engagement in the cultural sphere.” Laura 
R. Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair Use in 
Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705, 724 (2005). 
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writes: “many, perhaps most, entertainment products for sale today are 
produced by . . . collaborative authorship.”33  As argued above, in 
the relationship between collaborators, whether artists, musicians, 
choreographers, or architects, both artists win: their relationship and 
collaboration make them better individual artists.  Copyright laws 
acknowledge this and reward them with an exclusive right.  However, in 
every creative collaborative incident there is one contributor who does 
not win—the public.  In other words, collaboration that reaches artistic 
fruition is always dependent on collectively produced and owned social 
and cultural properties.  This Article rejects Romantic notions of creativity 
and authorship which stress the subjective experience of the author in 
order to perpetuate patterns of social denial and further diminish the 
rights of the general public.34  Tom Palmer most poignantly remarks: If 
rights are to be recognised in works of art and authorship anywhere, 
“they should be in the audience, and not in the artist, for it is on the 
audience that the art work depends for its continued existence, and not 
the artist.”35  Similarly, Ian Hacking, writing on social constructionism, 
remarks: “none of the examples is my own. I deliberately take historical 
case studies made by other people.”36  And in the preface to that book he 
writes: “Collectively my audiences were participating in the making of 
this book.”37
On this account, authors cannot claim, and in fact are not entitled to, 
any exclusive ownership rights of the products of their creative labour.  
After all, both the public and its members labored on each creation.  
While the individual author invests qualities from his original makeup, 
his subjective interpretation of the external reality, his talent, and 
financial resources, the public invests the social and cultural capital, 
 33. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 
1229 (2005). 
 34. Lord Macaulay does not deny the good in a copyright system.  However, the 
right is equivalent to a monopoly right and a monopoly is an evil: “For the sake of the 
good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is 
necessary for the purpose of securing the good.”  Lord Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in 
the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 199 
(Lady Trevelyan ed., 1879). 
 35. Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The 
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 848 
(1990). 
 36. IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 172 (1999) [hereinafter 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION]. 
 37. Id. at xi. 




necessary to transform an individual into an “author” and make him 
realize and translate his talent into the language of authorial creation.  In 
reality, we would all agree that the public invests the social and cultural 
capital; we would probably not reject the proclamation, “copyright is 
social.”  The problem, as William Cornish observes, is that many would: 
[R]evive the old cry that the creator derives as much, if not more, from the 
culture in which she was born and bred as she gives back in her work, and so 
deserves no property entitlement.  So far, however, these counterclaims appear 
to have had no more than marginal impact upon the copyright position that has 
built up over two centuries.38
Denying the social and cultural dependence of authors on the 
collective is the direct result of inherited and unmodified conceptions of 
ownership.39
Every argument on collaboration in copyright must also take account 
of the fact that every copyrighted work is limited ab initio due to the 
dependency on the contribution of the public.  The copyright bargain 
must reflect the fact that each copyright work is dependent on the 
public’s social and cultural input, and each work owes much to its 
predecessors while each informs its successors.  The question, “who authors 
copyrighted materials?” is not idle.  “We have met the author,” Wilf 
asserts, “and it is us.”  Although Wilf examines the paradigm of public 
authorship from a trademark perspective, his conclusion reflects the very 
idea behind the process of making copyrighted materials.  Despite the 
fact that we all recognise the social nature of authorial and artistic 
commodities, contemporary literature on intellectual property seems to 
perpetuate individualistic approaches to copyright, including when the 
theme is human cognitive ability.40  The next Part examines one of the 
main reasons why we have to ask “who authors copyrighted materials?”: 
our nonnegotiable insistence on sanctifying misleading conceptions of 
originality when we talk copyright. 
 38. WILLIAM CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 50 (2004). 
 39. However, since the institution of private property is both natural and 
human created, “[i]t is something that our culture can change when the day comes that 
we finally see how increasingly destructive and insensitive our existing ownership norms 
have become.”  Eric T. Freyfogle, The Construction of Ownership, U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 
177 (1996).  Similarly, Warren and Brandeis argue, “the individual shall have full 
protection in person and in property . . . but it has been found necessary from time to 
time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.”  Samuel D. Warren 
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
 40. See generally Bradford, supra note 32. 
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IV.  ORIGINAL APPROPRIATION: A DEFINITIONAL EXERCISE 
Copyright laws treat the individual author as an original proprietor of 
a newly created entity of social wealth.41  Originality in copyright, 
Justice O’Connor remarks, “means only that the work was independently 
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works).”42  Can 
we ever independently create?  The principle of original appropriation 
(OA) is a good point of departure from which to begin exploring the 
inequity in treating copyright works as works of original content rather 
than as manifestations of collective efforts.  I will not enter into an 
elaborate examination of that principle.  My aim here is rather modest: 
to draw benefits from a principle that is a key conceptual component in 
the skeletal definition of copyright. 
OA is the appropriation of resources that are not already appropriated 
by someone else.  It applies to things that are nullius in bonis (nobody’s 
private property).  OA theories hold that “[b]y hypothesis, there are no 
previous owners”43 and “[a]n illegitimate original acquisition would 
similarly infect all subsequent transfers.”44  OA is a term that comes to 
define a moment from which a given unowned resource has become the 
property of a given acquirer.  Copyright scholars do not explicitly refer 
to OA per se, but indirectly challenge its applicability to copyright.  In a 
seminal article, Litman argues that works of authorship can never be 
labelled totally “original.”  Because the act of authorial creation is “more 
akin to translation and recombination,” an author cannot be the original 
proprietor of an entire resource.45  In Litman’s words: 
To say that every new work is in some sense based on the works that preceded it 
is such a truism that it has long been a cliché, invoked but not examined.  But 
the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and 
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea. 
Composers recombine sounds they have heard before; playwrights base their 
characters on bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and other 
playwrights’ characters; novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots 
within their experience . . . lawyers transform old arguments to fit new facts; 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).  See generally Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the 
World: Fact, Opinion, and the Originality Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791 
(2001). 
 42. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 43. David Schmidtz, When is Original Appropriation Required, 73 MONIST 504, 
506 (1990). 
 44. John Arthur, Resource Acquisition and Harm, 17 CAN. J. PHIL. 337, 338 
(1987). 
 45. Litman, supra note 12, at 966. 




cinematographers, actors, choreographers, architects, and sculptors all engage in 
the process of adapting, transforming, and recombining what is already “out 
there” in some form.46
Scholarship on property often refers to the principle of OA.47  James 
Harris and Jeremy Waldron refer to “first occupancy.”  According to 
Harris, the tendency is to “clothe the law’s reliance on first occupancy as 
a root of title with the dress of natural right.”48  Yet, the legal and social 
dimensions of the right “must stipulate both what conduct is sufficient to 
constitute first occupancy” if at all, and “also what perimeter of trespassory 
rules in respect of the thing occupied, going beyond” should be 
allowed.49  In other words, while I might have a natural right in object O, 
it is a natural wrong for someone else to interfere with my right.50
For Waldron the concept of first occupancy relates to the relations 
between the first possessor of a recourse and subsequent rightholders: 
“[T]he first person to take possession of a resource does so, ex hypothesi, 
without pushing others aside, and, unless he voluntarily relinquishes that 
possession, he is the one that must be pushed aside by second and 
subsequent occupiers.”51  Similarly, James Penner refers to the term 
“first appropriation”52 and states that OA: 
[E]ssentially concerns the kind of advantages any individual may get by his own 
actions, by appropriating unowned things without the consent of others. . . .  A 
right of first appropriation in these contexts is a notional right the exercise of 
 46. Id. (citations omitted). 
 47. Benson, for example, argues that this principle is the only way to justify 
private acquisition. Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 752, 760 (Jules Coleman & 
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); see also Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 
13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1979). 
 48. J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 214 (1996). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Interestingly, Harris distinguishes between first occupancy in respect of 
individuals and first occupancy in respect of communities.  He views a community 
identity as stronger for a claim of first occupancy on the basis of natural law.  He writes: 
It may be argued that artefacts closely identified with the cultural identity of a 
particular community, which were taken from it in the past, ought now to be 
restored and vested in some agency representing the community, on the ground 
that, whether or not the taking was warranted by positive law, it constituted a 
natural wrong to the community. 
Id. at 216.  For a discussion on the tension between group authorship and the current 
intellectual property system, see Scafidi, supra note 17. 
 51. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 285-86 (1988).  Waldron 
rejects the principle of first occupancy because in the end, it means something like the 
following statement: “the first person who acts as though he is the owner of a resource 
gets to be its owner,” and such a view can only work “if private property has already 
been argued for.” Id. at 286-87. 
 52. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 80-82 (1997). 
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which in a parable about the justice of property rights inevitably leads to, i.e., 
creates, the property system.53
The conditions under which one can remove items that have no 
individual owner from the common, that is, are collectively owned, 
without the consent of the other commoners, is a core feature in John 
Locke’s theory on property54 and authors’ rights.55  Locke argues that a 
person becomes an original owner of a commonly owned object by 
virtue of expending either manual labour or intellectual labour.56  
However, the right is not unlimited.  With respect to tangible properties, 
the right is subject to several social conditions, of which the central one 
is that unless the person leaves in the common of all “enough and as 
good” resources for latecomers, he cannot appropriate.57  And, with respect 
to intangible properties, Locke imposes limits on the right and its duration 
in order to encourage education and disseminate knowledge.58  For 
example, he asserts that copies should be available “[f]or the use of public 
libraries and . . . universities,”59 and for the advancement of education.60  
And, with respect to the duration of authors’ rights, Locke writes: 
That any person or company should have patents for the sole printing of ancient 
authors is very unreasonable and injurious to learning.  And for those who 
purchase copies from authors that now live and write it may be reasonable to 
 53. Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
 54. On Lockean approaches to copyright, see PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41-72 (1996); Craig, supra note 15; Benjamin G. Damstedt, 
Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 
1179 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); 
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-330 
(1988). 
 55. See John Locke, Liberty of the Press, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS 329, 329-39 
(Mark Goldie ed., 1997) (1694); see also LORD PETER KING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN 
LOCKE 202-09 (photo. reprint 1984) (1884); 5 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 785-
95 (E.S. De Beer ed., 1979).  See generally Raymond Astbury, The Renewal of the 
Licensing Act in 1693 and Its Lapse in 1695, 33 LIBR. 296, 309 (5th ed. 1978); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS 
IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 154-55 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 
2001). 
 56. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 115, 127-28 (Mark Goldie ed., 2000).  For Locke’s discussion on manual 
and intellectual labour generally, see John Locke, Labour, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, 
supra note 55, at 326-28. 
 57. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 56, at 128. 
 58. Locke, Liberty of the Press, supra note 55, at 329-39. 
 59. Id. at 338. 
 60. Id. 




limit their property to a certain number of years after the death of the author or 
the first printing of the book as suppose 50 or 70 years.  This I am sure, ‘tis very 
absurd and ridiculous that anyone now living should pretend to have a property 
in or a power to dispose of the property of any copies or writings of authors who 
lived before printing was known and used in Europe. 61
Locke’s aim in his property theory is to “show how it is morally 
possible for private property in external things to arise . . . from a 
condition in which there is no such property at all.”62  Locke’s approach 
towards original appropriation is well ingrained in copyright policy and 
law.  For originality to be established, an author is required to employ 
certain intellectual effort. It must not lack the modicum of creativity 
necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression.63 
Once the work has qualified as an original work, the author is treated as 
an original appropriator of something new that never existed and had no 
previous owner. 
Although our copyright system tries to provide mechanisms in the 
spirit of Locke’s restrictions on the spectrum of the right, it treats the 
author as a sole creator of a new substance, thereby embracing a strict 
variation of the OA principle.  True, in the course of preparing a creative 
work, an author is allowed to copy ideas and concepts64 and nonsubstantial 
parts from others’ works.  This, in fact, proves that legislatures are not 
unaware of the fact that copyrighted creations are a merger between 
what is known and what is unknown and that new creations cannot be 
examined in isolation from already existing works.  However, under 
 61. Id. at 337; see also Raymond Astbury, supra note 55, at 296-97. 
 62. A. John Simmons, Original-Acquisition Justifications of Private Property, 
SOC. PHIL. POL’Y, Summer 1994, at 63, 72.  The question is whether a given justification 
is “a morally permissible (or morally possible) arrangement, even without any 
demonstration of its moral optimality.”  Id. at 70.  With regards to OA, justification 
should be interpreted as concerning not “the first brute takings by human beings, but 
rather the first creations of property by persons . . . .”  Id. at 76.  For further criticism of 
Locke’s approach to OA, see Gerald F. Gaus & Loren E. Lomasky, Are Property Rights 
Problematic?, 73 MONIST 483, 496-98 (1990); and Thomas Mautner, Locke on Original 
Appropriation, 19 AM. PHIL. Q. 259 (1982). 
 63. In comparative terms, the concept of originality has gone through many 
changes in recent years.  While U.S. courts require a modicum of creativity, their English 
counterparts remain steadfast on the original condition of skill, labour, and judgment.  
Furthermore, the Canadian Supreme Court made an attempt to provide a mid-way 
solution—labour and skill that is neither trivial nor mechanical in nature.  See Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-63 (1991); CCH Canadian Ltd. 
v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339; see also Telstra Corp. v. Desktop 
Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. (2001) F.C.A. 612 (Austl.).  For a comparative discussion of Feist, 
see Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of 
Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949 (2002); Guy Pessach, 
The Legacy of Feist Revisited: A Critical Analysis of the Creativity Requirement, 36 ISR. 
L. REV. 19 (2002); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, “Creativity,” and the 
Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 549 (1995). 
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
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copyright laws authorial and artistic entities are treated as original 
acquisitions of a given creator for the work originated in him and is his 
exclusive property, including parts produced by others or collectively 
owned by society. 
OA theories were challenged on two main grounds.  First, for 
Grunebaum, OA theories aim at justifying benefits associated with 
private ownership, and therefore fail to acknowledge other, nonprivate, 
forms of acquisition, although they carry similar benefits for collective 
and social appropriations.  Thus, OA arguments can only partially justify 
private property and do not adequately address the central dilemma.65  
They “specify the conditions for taking unowned goods; but ‘unowned’ 
can mean many things, depending on which conception of ownership is 
being assumed.  OA theorists mean by ‘unowned,’ not ‘privately owned.’ 
And this simply begs the question against alternative possible forms of 
ownership.”66  Second, Waldron argues that OA imposes unilateral 
obligations on people.  For this reason, we should be wary and suspicious 
of this principle.67  OA in copyright presupposes no ownership of the 
created work and imposes unilateral obligations on the collective.  It 
regards copyright as almost equivalent to creation ex nihilo.  It establishes a 
rigid dichotomy between privately owned materials and unowned 
elements.  It does not recognise a mid-way—one which would adequately 
compensate loss of collective contributions. As such, it refuses to 
acknowledge nonprivate ownership alternatives such as collective 
ownership of cultural properties. OA deliberately imposes obligations to 
respect the newly created private property on the public and allows, 
without the latter’s consent, private enclosures of sources integral to its 
collective identity. 
Public international law does recognise the inapplicability of OA to 
certain natural resources and regards them a part of mankind’s collective 
property—as “the common heritage of mankind.”68 I accept arguments 
 65. James O. Grunebaum, Ownership as Theft, 73 MONIST 544, 545-46. 
 66. Simmons, supra note 62, at 80 (referring to JAMES O. GRUNEBAUM, PRIVATE 
OWNERSHIP 53, 74, 80-81, 84-85 (1987)). 
 67. WALDRON, supra note 51, at 265-71; Simmons, supra note 62, at 81-84. 
 68. For example, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1970 U.N. Declaration of 
Principles Governing the Sea-bed and Ocean Floors stipulate that certain natural 
resources cannot be subject to national appropriation. Agreement Governing the 
Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. ii, Dec. 5, 1979, 1984 U.N.T.S. 
22; Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV),  
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2749 (Dec. 17, 1970), reiterated in U.N. Convention on the Law 




that copyright does recognise certain nonproprietable elements as part of 
“the common heritage of mankind” such as ideas, facts, and expressions 
to which protection has expired.69 But this is hampered by possible 
appropriation of ideas due to a lack of a coherent distinction between 
ideas and expressions,70 and the duration of the right,71 thereby allowing 
disproportionate private enclosures of traditions and other collective 
properties.  That is, our prevalent copyright system remotely qualifies 
for the so-called “common heritage” principle. 
If authorship cannot be examined in isolation from what is already in 
existence, can a copyrighted work ever represent an original manifestation 
of one (or more) individual’s creative input?  I want to push the argument 
one step further.  In the next Part, I examine the meaning behind the 
agreement we share that copyrighted works are socially constructed and 
historically contingent.  This is not an empty agreement, and through the 
social construction theory I show that copyright works represent the 
creative collectivity and can only be original creations in the collective 
sense.  That is to say, their defining features inevitably have a prior 
owner—the public. 
V.  SUBJECTS OF COPYRIGHT AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
A.  The Social Construction of “Whats” 
1.  The Argument 
A statement like “copyright is a social construction” sounds trivial or 
banal.72  No one would possibly deny that the institution of copyright is 
of the Sea art. 136-37, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.  For a brief overview, see 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 453-55 (5th ed. 2003). 
 69. It is arguable that the international community also recognises the common 
heritage principle via the increased recognition of rights in traditional knowledge. See 
e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community 
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275 (2001). 
 70. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303-304 
(2000)); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 183 (2003); European Council Directive 
93/98/EEC, Harmonising the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related 
Rights, art. 1, secs. 1, 2, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9; Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 
832 U.N.T.S 221 (entered into force July 10, 1974).  On the term protection generally, 
see Michael Jones, Eldred v. Ashcroft: The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85 (2004); Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael 
Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as 
Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003); and Catherine Seville, Copyright’s 
Bargain—Defining Our Terms, 2003 INTELL. PROP. Q. 312 (Eng.). 
 72. Social constructionism is defined as: “Analysis of ‘knowledge’ or ‘reality’ or 
both as contingent upon social relations, and as made out of continuing human practices, 
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premised on centuries of legal, social, and historical events, as well as 
artistic attitudes, cultural traditions, and conflicting economic aspirations.73  
If indeed all agree on the social and historical construction of the 
institution of copyright, is there any reason to discuss this statement?  
An answer to this question depends on the way it is interpreted. 
True, no copyright scholar would deny that copyright, as a legal 
institution, is a creature of historical events and social and cultural 
processes.  However, some would deny that the subjects of copyright74 
are social constructs.  When we refer to the Romantic vision of copyright, 
we refer precisely to this kind of denial: “I am the author. I created 
something new, almost equivalent to ex nihilo creation; independent of 
social conditions, and I therefore deserve an exclusive right to control 
the whole product created.”  I have already argued that it is not enough 
to recognise the sociality of the copyright creation act.  Mere recognition 
amounts to rejection of the many implications of copyright’s social 
nature.  The danger inherent in this tendency dominates our copyright 
landscape. 
Social constructionists hold that items we had thought were inevitable 
are social products.  Because of its many admirers, the social construction 
talk is open to scepticism and criticism.75  Social construction was once 
by process such as reification, sedimentation, habitualization.”  THE OXFORD COMPANION 
TO PHILOSOPHY 829 (Ted Honerich ed., 1995). 
 73. The history of copyright law has now amassed a considerable literature.  This 
approves the conclusion that there is agreement that the institution of copyright is 
socially constructed and historically situated.  See, e.g., RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN 
OF THE RIGHT TO COPY (2004); ROSE, supra note 25, at 35-84; BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL 
BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1999); NOAH 
WEBSTER, Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the United States, in A COLLECTION OF 
PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY, AND MORAL SUBJECTS 173, 175 (photo. reprint 1968) 
(1843); Daniel Burkitt, Copyrighting Culture—The History and Cultural Specificity of 
the Western Model of Copyright, 2001 INTELL. PROP. Q. 146 (Eng.); Jessica D. Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); L. 
Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ 
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909 (2003); Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: 
Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, in OF AUTHORS AND 
ORIGINS 23, 23-55 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994). 
 74. Examples of the subjects of copyright include authors as a species of person, 
original works of authorship, and the artist as a classification of entities. 
 75. The social construction debate is applied to many different fields: from race 
and ethnic identity to scientific facts, from oral history to reality and Zulu nationalism, 
knowledge, statistics, serial homicide, satellite systems, and authorship.  See, e.g., JEFF 
COULTER, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MIND (1979); JOAN FERRANTE & PRINCE 
BROWN, JR., THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES 




considered a “liberating idea”—almost a “code”;76 but it has become a 
banal statement of social conditions and obvious facts.77  This has become 
the norm in discussions of copyright and authorship: accepting, without 
qualification, that our institution of copyright is the product of historical 
events and social processes.  So, what could possibly account for the 
excitement in contending that copyright is socially constructed?  This is 
the answer.  Because intellectual property laws control our social and 
cultural realities, an examination of the interrelationships between intellectual 
properties and the social environment is a way of approaching questions 
about the scope of property in works protected under intellectual 
property laws and exploring the influence of those laws upon the social 
environment which they control.78
In copyright, as in any other legal institution, there are many elements 
that can be said to be socially constructed.  In fact, there can be almost 
an endless list of entities to which the question “what is socially 
constructed” may apply.  As Hacking puts it: “‘[T]he social construction 
of what?’ need not have a single answer.  That causes a lot of problems 
in constructionist debates.  People talk at cross purposes because they 
have different ‘whats’ in mind. Yet it is precisely the interaction between 
different ‘whats’ that makes the topic interesting.  And confusing . . . .”79  
The “whats” I examine are two: the author as a kind of a person and 
original works of authorship and art as a classification of entities. 
A preliminary question is whether universal social constructionism is 
coherent.  Sally Haslanger notes that one occasionally encounters the 
claim that everything is socially constructed “all the way down.”80  In 
that respect Hacking observes that most constructionism is not universal: 
“The authors who contributed books for my alphabetical list of topics, 
from authorship to Zulu nationalism, were making specific and local 
claims. What would be the point of arguing that danger, or the woman 
(1998); DAPHNA GOLAN, INVENTING SHAKA: USING HISTORY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
ZULU NATIONALISM (1994); THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 8; FRANKE 
WILMER, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MAN, THE STATE AND WAR (2002). 
 76. HACKING, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 36, at vii. 
 77. Id. at 35 (“The metaphor of social construction once had excellent shock value, 
but it has become tired.”).  Hacking concludes that he is not in favor of the language of 
social construction.  Id. at 122. 
 78. Social construction, if interpreted and viewed properly, can add to our armoury 
against the current state of affairs in copyright.  Indeed, as Hacking writes: “One of the 
attractions of ‘construction’ has been the association with radical political attitudes, 
stretching from bemused irony and angry unmasking up to reform, rebellion, and 
revolution.  The use of the word declares what side one is on.”  Id. at 35. 
 79. Id. at 27-28.  Yet “what is confused is sometimes more useful than what has 
been clarified.”  Id. at 29. 
 80. Sally Haslanger, Ontology and Social Construction, PHIL. TOPICS, Fall 1995, at 
95, 96, citing NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE AND GENDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 3, 59-60 (1989). 
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refugee, is socially constructed, if you thought that everything is socially 
constructed?”81  That is the spirit in which we should interpret social 
constructionism in copyright, for instance, among those who find it 
important enough to explicitly reiterate that copyright is “socially 
constructed and historically contingent,”82 or that the law “like a novel 
or a poem, has an author and hence is just a social construction.”83
Social constructionism, I shall show, is an invaluable explanatory tool 
in copyright’s present state of affairs because prevailing theories and 
approaches to intellectual property do not yet fully address how and why 
the role of the authorial collectivity is consistently denied in the 
copyright realm.  Here my attempt is to posit the ramifications and 
consequences of the sociality of copyright within the matrix of the social 
construction debate. 
2.  Hacking’s Formula 
In The Social Construction of What?, Hacking examines when and 
why we should refer to social constructionism.84  He offers a schema for 
evaluating different social constructionist claims.  Socially constructed 
entities are products of historical events, social forces, and ideology.85
Hence by constructionism (or social constructionism if we need, on occasion, to 
emphasize the social) I shall mean various sociological, historical, and 
philosophical projects that aim at displaying or analyzing actual, historically 
situated, social interactions or casual routes that led to, or were involved in, the 
coming into being or establishing of some present entity or fact.86
In general, the social constructionist attempts to criticise the status 
quo.  He may examine “the social construction of idea X, of X, of the 
experience of being X, and so on, and how these interact with each 
 81. HACKING, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 36, at 24.  Hacking rejects 
universal constructionism in many different junctures of his book.  He also writes, “An 
all-encompassing constructionist approach has become rather dull—in both senses of 
that word, boring and blunted.”  Id. at 36.  Similarly, Gergen and Gergen contend that 
the “anything goes” argument in social constructionism is wrong and based on 
“misunderstanding or ignorance of constructionist ideas.”  Mary Gergen & Kenneth J. 
Gergen, Introduction to Constructionism in Question, in SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 228, 
228 (Mary Gergen & Kenneth J. Gergen eds., 2003). 
 82. BOYLE, supra note 4, at 114. 
 83. Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization: The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. 
L. REV. 653, 656 (2004). 
 84. HACKING, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 36. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Id. at 48. 




other.”87  Hacking’s test of social constructionism is composed of four 
steps: one precondition and three primary conditions.  The precondition 
stipulates that “[p]eople begin to argue that X is socially constructed 
precisely when they find that: (0) In the present state of affairs, X is 
taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable.”88  According to Hacking, 
precondition (0) would not hold for the institution of copyright, because 
“institutions are the result of historical events and social processes.”89  It 
is obvious that our prevalent copyright regime was not inevitable: it is 
the contingent upshot of historical events and social processes.  On this 
account, copyright—the legal institution—fails to satisfy precondition 
(0).  The precondition, however, does hold for certain ideas of subjects 
of copyright, such as authors and original works of art and authorship, 
since ideas, Hacking argues, “with many of their connotations, seem 
inevitable.”90  From court decisions to academic writings and daily 
practice, authors and original works are taken for granted.  They appear 
to be inevitable, when in fact they are not.  Once these ideas are found to 
be taken as inevitable the social constructionist can move to examine the 
three primary conditions.  These conditions explain the very essence of 
Hacking’s formula:  
    Social construction work is critical of the status quo.  Social constructionists 
about X tend to hold that: 
 1. X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is.  X, or X as it is at 
present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. 
Very often constructionists go further, and urge that: 
1. X is quite bad as it is. 
2. We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically 
transformed. 
   A thesis of type (1) is the starting point: the existence or character of X is not 
determined by the nature of things.  X is not inevitable.  X was brought into 
existence or shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which could well 
have been different.  Many social construction theses at once advance to (2) and 
(3), but they need not do so.  One may realize that something, which seems 
inevitable in the present state of things, was not inevitable, and yet is not 
thereby a bad thing.  But most people who use the social construction idea 
enthusiastically want to criticize, change, or destroy some X that they dislike in 
the established order of things.91
 87. Id. at 123. 
 88. Id. at 12. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 14. 
 91. Id. at 6-7. 
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For Hacking, X ranges over many different kinds of things.  In order to 
avoid confusion he suggests that we distinguish between ideas (for 
example, concepts, beliefs, theories, and classifications)92 and objects 
(for example, people (children), states (childhood), institutions, fundamental 
particles (quarks) and child viewers (of television)).93  Common to all 
these items is that the X need not have been “at all as it is.”94  X is a 
creature of causation, and social and historical processes.  After all, as 
Hacking remarks, “[c]onstruction stories are histories.”95
In order to assess the reason for applying a social constructionist 
approach to X, it is crucial to ask how obvious is the claim that “X is a 
social construct.”  Hacking says that if it is utterly obvious to everyone 
that X satisfies proposition (1), then we should not bother using the 
language of social construction. On this account, battered women, for 
example, are considered social constructions.  When X = battered 
women, steps (1), (2), and (3) are utterly obvious: they are the result of 
social forces such as domestic violence and a weak legal system; they 
are not determined by the nature of things.  No one, except maybe 
ancient barbarian societies, would deny that a battered woman is a “bad 
thing.” Society would be better off if violence against women was totally 
outlawed and abandoned.  Similarly, when X = authors, we can see that 
X satisfies proposition (1). Authors are not determined by the nature of 
things—when X = authors, X need not have been “at all as it is.”  Social 
constructionists would argue that authors are wrongly perceived as 
almighty creators, and X has to be redefined and transformed. 
The same argument holds for institutions.  For example, when X = the 
institution of copyright, propositions (1), (2), and (3) are painfully 
obvious.  I doubt anyone would reject the argument that copyright is 
highly contingent: a “bad thing” as it stands today (either from the point 
of view of authors and entertainment industries (“we want more 
control”) or from the perspective of the public interest (“copyright went 
too far”)).96  And it should, as many argue, not be abolished, but 
 92. Id. at 22. 
 93. Id. at 21-22. 
 94. Id. at 6-7. 
 95. Id. at 37. 
 96. Here I should be more careful and accept the fact that some people may agree 
with proposition (2) claiming, for example, that the existing copyright system provides a 
coherent balance between the rights of authors and the public interest.  They may point 
to the fact that we do not have perpetual copyright or an open-ended list of exclusive 
rights.  However, I was hard put to find committed partisans of the status quo. Why does 




radically transformed.  If it is utterly obvious that authors and the 
institution of copyright are socially constructed—that they are “the 
contingent upshot of social arrangements”97—what is the added value in 
discussing the social construction of authors or copyright?  Hacking’s 
reply to this question is that we ought to be attentive to the context.98  
According to his account, it is not the author or the institution of 
copyright that are socially constructed, but rather the classifications of 
what copyright, the system, protects.  Then, X in copyright (for purposes 
of the present analysis) = (1) authors as a specific kind of a person; and 
(2) original works of art and authorship; or as Hacking might say, the 
ideas of (1) and (2).99
Hacking asserts that “[w]hat is socially constructed is not, in the first 
instance, the individual people,”100 for example, authors.  Rather, what is 
socially constructed is the classification “authors”: “the classification 
itself, and the matrix within which the classification works.”101  An 
author, as a specific kind of person, is what matters for social 
construction discourse.  We should not understand X to mean every 
individual, but the individual falling under the idea—individual qua 
“author” of a work is a social construction.  Classifying a given work as 
original, or a person as an author, is a product of social events and 
historical processes, cultural traditions and conflicts, artistic revolutions, 
and legislative developments that have and continue to shape the nature 
of art, authorship, and their makers.  The X in copyright—authors and 
original works—is changed by being so classified.  Without this X, 
copyright would have become an empty statement—a meaningless legal 
principle.  That is, we have to know what we want to ask: 
Think what the category of genius did to those Romantics who saw themselves 
as geniuses, and what their behavior did in turn to the category of genius 
itself. . . . If someone talks about the social construction of genius . . . they are 
likely talking about the idea, the individuals falling under the idea, the 
interaction between the idea and the people, and the manifold of social practices 
and institutions that these interactions involve: the matrix, in short.102
copyright attract so much academic interest?  Why does almost every layman have a take 
on copyright?  The reason is that we do not agree on proposition (2): the majority of us 
would agree that it is a bad thing, whether from the perspective of the author and the 
industry or the general public interest. 
 97. HACKING, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 36, at 12. 
 98. Id. at 9 (discussing social construction in the context of women refugees). 
 99. Id. at 10-11.  Hacking uses authorship as an item relevant to the social 
construction talk and refers to authors as kinds of people.  Id. at 33-34, 58. 
 100. Id. at 10. 
 101. Id. at 11. 
 102. Id. at 34. 
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Hacking contends that we can incorporate social construction talk into 
our daily discourse on a variety of issues, but not wholesale.103  It would 
be banal to write a book entitled “The Social Construction of the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative and the 2005 Special 301 Report.”  It 
would also be banal to write a book on “The Social Construction of the 
European Trade Mark Office in Alicante” which is an institution 
developed from social and political changes in Europe, from the growing 
commercial sentiment to brand names and sources, and from 
developments in consumer preferences, and recently changed due to the 
enlargement of the Union.  This title would not satisfy precondition (0).  
But we can imagine a startling title on “The Social Construction of 
Trade Marks” addressing the question “who authors trademarks?” 
emphasizing that trademarks are linguistic inventions produced in the 
marketplace by consumers, and examining the consumer as a kind of 
person. 
Hacking distinguishes between idea-construction and object-construction.  
Although any such distinction between ideas and objects seems vague, it 
may help determine when we should use the language of social 
construction.104  Some objects, on Hacking’s account, are socially constructed, 
while others are not.  In particular, Hacking is concerned with certain 
kinds, for example, women refugees and the child viewer.  A main 
feature in his argument is the concept of “interactive kinds.”105  An 
author is an interactive kind. An author interacts with similar kinds, for 
example, authors and artists, with individuals falling under other 
 103. A good example of Hacking’s application of social constructionism pertains to 
science.  He argues that on the one hand, the “constructionist holds that explanations for 
the stability of scientific belief involve, at least in part, elements that are external to the 
professed content of the science.  These elements typically include social factors, 
interests, networks, or however they be described.”  Id. at 92. On the other hand, 
“[o]pponents hold that whatever be the context of discovery, the explanation of stability 
is internal to the science itself.”  Id.  The latter regards scientists as a special social 
stratum; as discoverers and proprietors of ultimate truths; as “the deep probers of the 
inner constitution of things.”  Id. at 95. 
 104. Id. at 102.  “When someone speaks of the social construction of X, you have to 
ask, X = what? A first move is to distinguish between objects, ideas, and the items named 
by elevator words such as ‘fact,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘reality.’”  Id. at 68; see also id. at 10-11, 
14, 21-22, 28-30.  “Elevator words” are words such as “fact,” “truth,” “reality,” and 
“knowledge.”  “These words are used to say something about the world, or about what 
we say or think about the world.”  Id. at 22-23.  Following his rejection of universal 
social constructionism Hacking criticises discussions on the social construction of 
“elevator words.”  For example, regarding reality he remarks that the social construction 
of reality “sounds like the social construction of everything.”  Id. at 24. 
 105. Id. at 32, 102-05. 




categories and within the different categories themselves.106  Hacking 
gives as an example the difference between quarks and children. The 
former is an indifferent kind.107  Quarks are the building blocks of the 
universe: “Quarks are not aware that they are quarks and are not altered 
simply by being classified as quarks.”108  An interactive kind is aware of 
its classification and through this awareness it maintains its identity as a 
member of this classification.  This awareness “may be personal, but 
more commonly is an awareness shared and developed within a group of 
people, embedded in practices and institutions to which they are 
assigned in virtue of the way in which they are classified.”109  It is an 
awareness that operates within a “larger matrix of institutions and 
practices surrounding this classification.”110  So, the classification or 
idea of “authors” takes place within a matrix of social institutions that 
shape and control the future evolution of individual authors and artists.  
In this way, the author, as a certain kind of person, is socially 
constructed.111  Hacking takes the example of authorship and argues that 
it is built around kinds of people, such as authors: 
People of these kinds can become aware that they are classified as such.  They 
can make tacit or even explicit choices, adapt or adopt ways of living so as to fit 
or get away from the very classification that may be applied to them.  These 
very choices, adaptations or adoptions have consequences for the very group, 
for the kind of people that is invoked.  The result may be particularly strong 
interactions.  What is known about people of a kind may become false because 
 106. Hacking terms this the “looping effect.”  It occurs when people, such as 
authors and artists, interact with the systems of classification they fall under.  In 
Hacking’s words, “People classified in a certain way tend to conform to or grow into the 
ways that they are described; but they also evolve in their own ways, so that the 
classifications and descriptions have to be constantly revised.”  IAN HACKING, 
REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENCES OF MEMORY 21 (1995); 
see also Ian Hacking, The Looping Effects of Human Kinds, in CAUSAL COGNITION 351, 
351-94 (Dan Sperber et al. eds., 1995).  In this way Hacking explains the social 
evolution of knowledge of human kinds.  He writes that looping effects mark “a cardinal 
difference between the traditional natural and social sciences” because “[t]he targets of 
natural sciences are stationary” while “the targets of the social sciences are on the 
move.”  HACKING, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 36, at 108. 
 107. HACKING, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 36, at 104-06. 
 108. Id. at 32.  Can quarks be socially constructed? Hacking asserts that: 
Perhaps it is the idea of quarks, rather than quarks, which is the social 
construction.  Both the process of discovering quarks and the product, the 
concept of the quark and its physical applications, interest historians of 
science. . . .  All these ideas have histories, as does any idea, and they have 
different types of history, including social histories.  But quarks, the objects 
themselves, are not constructs, are not social, and are not historical. 
Id. at 30; see also id. at 68-70. 
 109. Id. at 104. 
 110. Id. at 103. 
 111. Id. at 11. 
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people of that kind have changed in virtue of what they believe about 
themselves.112
Authors and artists may become aware that they are classified as such.  
They work and create within a matrix of social and political institutions 
that affect the very essence of the classification. They make artistic 
choices, and copyright law accommodates these choices. These artistic 
choices have consequences for the very group. Strong interactions 
between people of this kind are inevitable. Artistic and authorial 
activities are dependent on interaction. Despite her criticism of the 
limited applicability of Hacking’s formula, Haslanger writes that “ideas 
and objects interact in complex ways and transform each other over 
time. Broadly speaking, social construction is about this complex 
interaction. . . . [I]t may appear that social construction is all about 
causation. . . .”113
Copyright is a prime example of an institution in which the very 
existence of its subjects—authors and original works—is dependent on 
complex interaction and causation.  The role of the authorial collectivity 
reaffirms that interaction between authors, artists, and the influences of 
the matrix in which they create, define the creative act, and determine 
the success of its results.  Copyright law embraces concepts like originality 
and creativity, which were and still are created via false beliefs about 
what authors and artists can really do.  Authors, supported by the courts 
and policy makers, believe they create in a social vacuum, without the 
contribution of the public.  They do not acknowledge the matrix.  In this 
way, false beliefs about authorship are nurtured and eventually find their 
way into our copyright culture.  If we want to see a change in copyright 
we have to understand the classification of authors and artists and what it 
consists of. 
The institution of copyright fails precondition (0). No one would 
possibly deny that it is not inevitable.  However, contemporary classifications 
and ideas of the author and the original works he creates will not arise 
but for the existence of certain objects, including the institution.  So, can 
we claim that because the object is an obvious social construct, the ideas 
it generates are ipso facto obvious social constructs and thus fail 
precondition (0)?  Would that not negate the applicability of Hacking’s 
formula to copyright in general?  Would anyone deny that we build on 
 112. Id. at 34. 
 113. Sally Haslanger, Social Construction: The “Debunking” Project, in SOCIALIZING 
METAPHYSICS 301, 305 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003). 




works of our predecessors, that we live in a social context which affects 
our sense of aesthetics and taste, that we paint because painting is 
accepted as an artistic activity invented by social and cultural 
developments?  Despite my doubts that anyone would deny that authors 
and the ideal of solitary authorship are obvious social constructs, many, 
at the same time, forcefully adhere to these Romantic ideals, and treat 
them as inevitable when they need not be so.  We may at least agree that 
authors and ideas of original works are constructs of some sort; they are 
not born from thin air.  But if not socially constructed, how else?114
Even if we all agree that the institution of copyright is socially 
constructed we may not, and often still do not, understand the full 
implications of this.  We perpetuate conceptions of the lone author and 
his entitlement to exclusive property rights in his creations.  We accept 
the public interest as a guiding principle to determine how much 
property we should give authors.  But, at the same time, the public 
interest is not sufficiently reflected in our copyright regime and authors’ 
rights are constantly strengthened.  Perhaps a universal agreement that X 
is socially constructed may debunk the lore behind the social construction 
talk.  But this argument, I think, is not compelling enough to seep into every 
legal institution.  When the thesis is present, but at the same time ignored, it 
nurtures ill-defined conceptions and principles.  An obvious case of social 
construction should not always be a reason to dismiss the need for social 
construction dialogue.  To equate copyright to other traditional institutions is 
to miss the point.  Copyright is a mechanism for control of intangibles—of 
commodities with distinct social content that are collectively produced and 
should be jointly owned by public and authors.  It is not the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, the European Trademark Office, the Federal 
Bank, the Ministry of Education, nor the Monarchy. 
I believe social constructionism may be illuminating even with respect 
to institutions and objects that are obviously social constructions.  
Scholars mention the construction of authorship and the idea of copyright, 
but they do not take any radical steps to truly realize the implications of 
copyright’s social construction.  I agree with Hacking’s formula.  If we 
all think of the institution of copyright as a social construct, it is instructive 
to deal with the ideas, objects and classifications comprising it.  Not only 
that, the formula is also valuable in reminding us to seek more clarity 
when we use the vernacular of copyright and social construction.  
However, as Hacking remarks, “Talk of construction tends to undermine 
the authority of knowledge and categorization.  It challenges complacent 
assumptions about the inevitability of what we have found out or present 
 114. HACKING, supra note 36, at 39-40. 
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ways of doing things . . . .”115  Hence, we have to be careful not to restrict 
the use we make of social constructionism.  If “[c]onstructionists are 
greatly concerned with questions of power and control,”116 restricting 
social constructionism, something that might be suitable for certain facts 
of the world and discoveries (but not their ideas), runs the risk of leaving 
great parts of the present copyright system as they are today.  In 
copyright, that is, social constructionism should apply to the institution, 
authors as a specific kind of person, and original works of art and 
authorship. 
B.  Constructing Stages and Assembling 
Hacking remarks that causal routes lead to and are involved in “the 
coming into being or establishing of some present entity or fact”117 and 
he argues that we take more seriously the idea that a construction is a 
kind of “building, or assembling from parts.”118  How should we define 
the act of composing from different parts a copyrighted entity?  This 
question is closely related to my criticism of solitary authorship.  It has 
other parallels in philosophers’ articulations of the relation between the 
social environment and who we are.  For example, social relations and 
causality are not absent from John Locke’s philosophy of knowledge and 
his insistence on the role of experience, and our ability to assemble 
(rather than create) is well ingrained in his “workmanship model.”  
Locke argues that individuals are not makers or creators of products ex 
nihilo.  For the most part, they tend to mix their labour with commonly 
owned objects.119
Whether viewed from the standpoint of interaction, social relations, 
social dependence, or causality,120 copyright creation is, in other words, 
 115. Id. at 58. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 48. 
 118. Id. at 49. 
 119. See, e.g., GOPAL SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY 
37-41, 47-92 (1995); JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY 35-50 (1980); JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 198-201, 213 (1988); A. John Simmons, 
Makers’ Rights, 2 J. ETHICS 197 (1998). 
 120. Interaction depends on social relations.  It creates causal relations.  It creates 
derivatives.  We are dependent on interaction if we, for example, want to understand the 
world around us; to understand different approaches to art or modern adaptations of 
Baroque music.  In The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckmann provide a 
sociological analysis of everyday life and knowledge that guides conduct in everyday 
life.  They do not claim that everything is socially constructed nor do they advocate 




a process of putting together—“building or assembling from parts.”121  
Hacking advocates a definition of building which should be followed by 
all social constructionists.  Hacking notes,  “Buildings are always more 
than the sum of their parts.”122  For Hacking, “Anything worth calling a 
construction was or is constructed in quite definite stages, where the 
later stages are built upon, or out of, the product of earlier stages.  
Anything worth calling a construction has a history.  But not just any 
history.  It has to be a history of building.”123  We cannot claim to have 
created something that has no history and no causal relations to existing 
templates. “This is because there is something of a historical step-by-step 
building of specific techniques, institutions, and problems, each using 
previous steps, and assembled to form a further stage in the production 
of later techniques, institutions, and problems.”124
An original copyright work is an example of a socially constructed 
entity that has “a history of building.”  The same is true for authors.  
Copyrighted works and authors represent the authorial collectivity and 
are dependent on predecessors’ efforts and works.  At the same time, a 
copyright work is not merely the sum of these efforts; it generates some 
unique added value which makes it worthy of protection.  An author, a 
socially constructed kind of a person, can only be said to build 
copyrighted entities; not to create.  Authors and artists assemble different 
entities.  But they do not merely connect “the dots to complete a picture.  
They had to put in the dots.”125  In this way, they take already existing 
works and templates in new directions and make their efforts eligible for 
copyright protection.  Copyright creation is a continuous activity: a 
process of absorbing, assembling, translating, adding, and then expressing.126
universal constructionism.  They begin with the reality of everyday life and argue that it 
is premised on social relations and material objects.  PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS 
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 19-34 (1966).  They claim that a 
person’s “natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others.”  Id. 
at 22.  Every person is a member of society and participates in its dialectic, internalises 
its social elements, and uses them in his daily reality.  Id. at 129.  Participation and 
interaction renders the products of these activities derivative.  Berger and Luckmann also 
argue that social reality has both objective and subjective dimensions.  Id. at 47-183.  
This is another way of explaining why copyrighted entities are neither ultimately public 
nor private, but a joint enterprise that takes authors and artists beyond what is already 
known. 
 121. HACKING, supra note 36, at 50. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 53. 
 125. Id. at 76. 
 126. To explain this process, Robert Weisberg uses the terms continuity and 
discontinuity.  See ROBERT W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY 201 (1993). 
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C.  Defending Radical Constructionism 
Copyright is neither a natural resource nor a fact the world comes 
wrapped up with.127  Its equivalent is not the DNA double helix or the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics.  If one thinks normal science progresses 
in an inevitable way, one has to realize that copyright is not scientific.  If 
copyright were to be science, an anticonstructionist philosopher would 
claim that it is false to think that “people in pursuit of certain ends could, 
in their interactions with the world, have gone more than one way.”128  
Then he would argue that existing patterns dominating the institution of 
copyright—the Romantic vision of authorship and originality, the 
limited scope of fair dealing exceptions, and the seemingly constant 
extension of the duration to almost perpetuity—when combined, define 
the only way to go.  It would be wrong to restrict the understanding of 
copyright’s evolution on the basis of certain patterns.  Interactions, social 
reliance,  and causality dominate the landscape of copyright creation.  
The danger in copyright is that once one insists on only one way, one is 
able to transform that way into an almost irresistible factual ingredient of 
our social reality. 
When it comes to copyright, radical constructionism is plausible, for 
almost everything in copyright is socially constructed all the way down, 
including both the institution and subjects of copyright.  How radical 
this view is can be assessed with a test Hacking proposes involving three 
 127. Yet, that does not mean that scientific discoveries are not social.  In the 
sciences we tend to cling to the myth of sudden illuminations that engender life-changing 
inventions.  For example, Newton’s well known formulation of the universal law of 
gravity was a synthesis of ideas proposed by thinkers such as Ptolemy, Copernicus, 
Kepler, Galileo, and Hooke.  The Wright Brothers’ invention of the first airplane was not 
created in isolation from earlier attempts, like, for instance, Lilienthal’s invention of the 
flying glider.  On Watt’s model of a steam engine it was said that it is about time to 
reject “the still current popular fallacy that James Watt ‘invented’ the steam engine.”  
L.T.C. ROLT & J.S. ALLEN, THE STEAM ENGINE OF THOMAS NEWCOMEN 12 (1977). 
Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of the DNA double helix is not 
different.  Watson and Crick were not working in a vacuum—neither an intellectual nor a 
social vacuum.  In the words of Longino, “the work of producing a structural description of 
the DNA molecule was social, both collaborative and competitive.”  HELEN E. LONGINO, 
THE FATE OF KNOWLEDGE 194 (2002).  Crick himself remarks that a few days following 
his arrival to the laboratory he “knew what to do: imitate Linus Pauling and beat him at 
his own game.”  JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX 48 (1968).  I should state that I 
am not interested in finding the ancestors of the first creative work or the steam engine 
but rather to show how creativity, whether in sciences or the arts, cannot be conceived or 
produced without relying on the public. 
 128. HACKING, supra note 36, at 98. 




“sticking points”: contingency, nominalism, and external explanations of 
stability.129  On this account: (1) there is no indication that one ought to 
have gone the way one did, and (2) entity X has no inherent structure. 
For the nominalist, the world is not bundled with facts. Facts are akin to 
consequences of the different ways in which we represent the world.  
The nominalist aims “to be true to experience and interaction”;130 and (3) 
that the ultimate explanation for the stability of scientific beliefs to some 
extent, depends on their relations to external factors.  That is, the answer 
to the question of whether the origin of idea X is based on how the world 
is, is no.  While opponents of constructionism would argue that the world 
has an inherent structure, the constructionist would argue that there can 
be no predetermination of the results of X—it cannot be determined “by 
how the world is.”131  We and the social relations governing history are 
dependent on interaction which produces these relations. 
The approach I present in this Article is “a species of nominalism.”132  
In copyright, there is a key role for interaction, social dependence, and 
causal relations: they define authorship and make ideals of the author 
possible.  In Hacking’s test one can score fifteen points maximum: five 
for each of the three sticking points.133  What one can score on contingency 
must be examined in light of the authorial collectivity.  The next Part 
lends further support to the argument that social constructionism is not a 
mere definitional tool.  I examine whether the public role within the 
social construction paradigm means that its contribution is of authorial 
value.  In particular, I argue that an author comes wired with some innate 
endowment.  That is, the claim that in copyright nothing determines that 
one ought to go the way one did, is partly inaccurate.  Probably, no one 
would object to the argument that our original constitution has an impact 
on what we favor or the paths we choose to follow, unless of course, one 
argues against innateness altogether or that every segment of our original 
constitution is only social construction.  However, innate capacity bereft 
of collective contribution will never develop into a real ability that an 
author can utilize in the creative process. 
 129. Id. at 63-99. 
 130. Id. at 84.  The nominalist believes that “[t]he world does not come tidily sorted 
into facts.  People constitute facts in a social process of interaction with the world and 
intervening in its affairs.”  Id. at 174. 
 131. Id. at 73. 
 132. Id. at 33. 
 133. Id. at 99. 
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VI.  THE AUTHORIAL ROLE OF THE PUBLIC 
A.  The Question Posed 
I began this Article with the observation that the Romantic vision of 
the author is a fiction, which falsely embraces OA theories as its 
justificatory baseline.  I raised objections to this fiction and argued that 
copyright creation is a process to which contribution is received from 
sources other than the individual author.  I believe that understanding the 
origin and role of creative knowledge may well resolve some subtle 
questions in copyright policy.134  The difficulty is that in the copyright 
discourse we tend to ignore issues such as the origin of authorial and 
artistic knowledge.  In the words of Michael Madison: “How do ‘creative’ 
works of authorship come about?  We care about the copyright system 
because we care about the answers to these questions, yet the questions 
are rarely asked in a formal way in connection with copyright debates.”135  
Madison’s remark is closely related to the basic argument of this Article: 
creative works come about when authors and the public collaborate. 
That authorial manifestations and artistic endeavours are social items 
is axiomatic.  They represent individuals’ experiences of the external 
reality through socially shared categories and “a set of public standards 
to which community members appeal in critical discursive interactions.”136  
The larger community owns and nurtures these shared categories and 
standards without which the creative act would be stunted.  I argue that 
the sociality of copyright creations imposes on us a duty to reward 
sources that contribute to the realization of the creative ability.  Although no 
one is likely to deny that copyrighted works are social entities, this Part 
is the beginning of a riposte to those who would doubt whether the 
public’s social contribution amounts to a de facto contribution, and 
entitle the public to a similar right to that of the individual author. 
B.  Wallas’s Four-Step Test 
A test offered by Wallas best illustrates the ongoing reliance of 
authors on the public and the external environment while engaging in 
 134. On this issue, see Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright 
Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 (2001). 
 135. Michael J. Madison, Comment, Where Does Creativity Come From? And 
Other Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 759-60 (2003). 
 136. LONGINO, supra note 127, at 148. 




creative activities.  The test shows the public’s crucial place in the 
creative process.  Wallas is recognised as the first to clearly formulate 
the demarcation of the cognitive steps involved in the production of 
novelty.137  He argues for a cumulative test, composed of four complementary 
stages, common to all creative activity: preparation, incubation, illumination, 
and verification.  The first stage, preparation, involves a long period of 
intense conscious work, without any obvious milestones.  During that 
period, after ideas are generated and considered, the issue is put aside 
and not consciously dwelt upon.  At this time the second stage, incubation, 
commences.  In the incubation stage the ideas on which the creator 
thought consciously take new shape and meaning, as they are combined 
in new ways in the unconscious.  Once conceptual incubation is completed, 
illumination, the third step, comes into play.  Illumination does not 
provide the creator with the ultimate answer or solution but rather a 
glimmer of what it is likely to be, while the solution often comes with 
the final fourth stage, verification.138
This four-step test demonstrates the social dependence and causal 
relation between each segment of the chain of creative activity.  Each 
step builds and relies on preceding steps and each in turn feeds the steps 
ahead.  In fact, Robert Weisberg tells us, “Most of the artists and poets 
reported that Wallas’s four-stage process . . . described their work. 
They said that an idea for a painting or a poem was not worked on 
immediately, but was first ‘carried around’ for a period of time.”139
C.  The Test in Reality 
1.  Collective Authorship and Social Dependence 
Copyright law considers authorial and artistic works as independent 
original creations, not an advance over prior art.  The social nature of 
knowledge production and knowledge accumulation plays no significant 
role in copyright debates—a role, given the many social approaches to 
copyright, one would expect it play.  However, in the present copyright 
system, there are principles that attest to the reliance on the public.  For 
 137. GRAHAM WALLAS, THE ART OF THOUGHT (abr. ed. 1949); see also WEISBERG, 
supra note 126, at 47-48 (referring to Wallas’s test). 
 138. Another step of “intuition” was claimed to be a relevant hidden link in 
Wallas’s four-step test.  It is a step that could come between incubation and illumination 
since creative intuition concerns “vague anticipatory perception that orients creative 
work in a promising direction.”  Emma Policastro, Creative Intuition: An Integrated 
Review, 8 CREATIVITY RES. J. 99, 99 (1995); see also WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 27-68; 
Jan E. Eindhoven & W. Edgar Vinacke, Creative Processes in Painting, 47 J. GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 139, 139-140 (1952). 
 139. WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 47. 
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example, the fact that, within copyright law, nonsubstantial parts can be 
copied indicates that the law recognises reliance on the pubic domain.  
The idea-expression dichotomy also shows that an individual is in need 
of publicly owned raw materials such as ideas, concepts, and facts.  
There is nothing, however, in our copyright law that recognises the 
dependence of ideas on publicly shared and produced concepts and other 
cultural properties for matters of ownership. 
Copyright laws do not only disproportionately reward the author.  The 
rules they embrace for the sake of the public interest are ill defined.  If 
one refers to raw materials as common property or common knowledge, 
in copyright the vague distinction between ideas and expressions 
guarantees that common can become private and that enclosure of 
portions of the public domain is not too difficult.  In addition, copyright 
permits protection to last over a century.140
An author’s ability to translate common knowledge into copyrighted 
entities is not innate but certainly influenced by many factors such as 
creative ability, and visions of taste and aesthetics. Research on 
creativity is burdened with the question whether the creative act is a 
creature of social dependence and interaction or not.141  Copyright laws 
recognise the role of interaction and social dependence in, for example, 
debates on the scope of copyright ownership, the notions of improvement 
on existing works, parodies, transformative authorship and transformative 
uses (certain uses that add new material in a way that reflects critically 
on the original work), fair dealing, and the rights of second generation 
creators.142  They allow creators “to utilize raw material without 
incurring liability for infringement.”143  In this way, copyright laws hope 
to strike a balance between the rights of first and second generation 
 140. See supra note 71 for examples of the various copyright laws in force in the 
United States and Europe. 
 141. See generally TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996); 
MARGARET A. BODEN, THE CREATIVE MIND: MYTHS AND MECHANISMS (Routledge 2d ed. 
2004) (1990); MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); WEISBERG, supra note 126; THE CREATIVE 
COGNITION APPROACH (Steven M. Smith et al. eds., 1995); CREATIVITY (P.E. Vernon ed., 
1970); CREATIVITY: A DISCUSSION AT THE NOBEL CONFERENCE  (John D. Roslansky ed., 
1970); DIMENSIONS OF CREATIVITY (Margaret A. Boden ed., 1994); THE NATURE OF 
CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 
1987). 
 142. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1027-29 (1997). 
 143. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 584 (2001). 




creators.  As O’Rourke remarks, “copyright law does not extend protection 
to factual information because such information is the core raw material 
that others need to use to further progress.”144
Many factors interact in the process of copyright creation.  The 
interdependence between art, culture, and society renders social 
dependence, interaction, and causality key features in the creation of 
copyrightable material.  In general, inputs can be divided into two 
categories: factors that depend on past experiences, on social and 
cultural traditions, and on the availability of collective properties; and 
factors that form part of a person’s innate endowment.  Neither of these 
categories alone is sufficient for generating creative activity.  Copyright 
generation and its expressive entities are realized through the interaction 
of these two categories. 
Rosemary Coombe introduces the concept “recoding” into copyright 
theory and argues that the creative process is a complex one that requires 
the availability of publicly accessible symbols.145  The interaction 
between collective production of these symbols and individual consumption 
make the creative act possible.  She writes that “the consumption of 
commodified representational forms is productive activity in which 
people engage in meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to 
their own agendas.”146  Meaning-making is not an internal process.  People 
are engaged in meaning-making, they do not create from nothing and the 
availability of external objects, which the individual absorbs and 
modifies, determines the success of the creative act. Similar to Coombe, 
Steven Wilf and Tom Palmer argue that meaning-making is an activity 
determined and shaped by many factors—an activity shared between 
authors and consumers.147
The interpretive role of the public should not, however, become the 
baseline on which to legitimize new limits to copyright ownership.  I 
argue that authorial and artistic properties are limited ab initio due to the 
dependency on the contribution of the public.  The creative act combines 
the contribution of the collective and that of the individual authors. 
Take the thinking process as an example.  Thinking is a preliminary 
step and a core factor in the making process of copyright works.  It is 
considered an “internal process which brings the organization laid down 
in past learning to bear upon responses to current situations, and which 
 144. Id. 
 145. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics, supra note 13, at 1863. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Palmer, supra note 35; Wilf, supra note 7. 
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shapes those responses in keeping with inner needs.”148  Thought is 
dependent on external objects.  It is fueled by consumption of shared 
symbols, images and other structured relations, social processes, and 
cultural events.  In other words, the human mind and its creative 
functioning depend on past experiences and, to a great extent, on the 
chance occurrence of certain events.  Thought is a process of 
conceptualization whereby man’s world is symbolized or schematized.  
Copyrighted works reduce the abstract conceptualisation to the way an 
author associates his ideas with existing objects, identifies, and 
“tangibly” expresses his ideal reflection of the world. 
Translated into the language of creation, Author A and Author B can 
create by employing two opposite modes of thought: convergent and 
divergent.  The former involves “solving well-defined, rational problems 
that have one correct answer,”149 and the latter is more akin to 
“originality in picking unusual associations of ideas.”150  Authors would 
normally be recognised for their divergent thinking.  The author, who 
possesses the ability to create copyrightable works, has a capacity to 
combine internal and external resources to create an unanticipated 
result—the ability to create ABZ from A and B.  He asks “why” or 
“how”; interprets, defines, composes, and actualises existing elements; 
creates derivatives; merges diverse elements to one operative figure; and 
produces unique materials.  He has a greater openness to experience.  
Weisberg adds to this list other characteristics shared by all creative 
individuals: broad interests, independence of judgement, self-confidence, 
intuition, and a firm sense of the self as a “creative” being.151  However, 
the degree to which authors possess these attributes varies between 
authors A and B.  This is how we come to have Dostoyevsky’s tragedies; 
the story of Proteus who, in book IV of the Odyssey, turns into a lion and 
a snake, a panther and a boar, a stream and a great tree in leaf; Dickens’s 
“Great Expectations”; one who caricatures different events and political 
figures and another who poeticizes them. 
 148. WILLIAM VINACKE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING 7 (1952) (emphasis added); 
see also GEORGE SHOUKSMITH, INTELLIGENCE, CREATIVITY AND COGNITIVE STYLE 22 
(1970) (citing Vinanke’s work). 
 149. CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 141, at 60. 
 150. Id.  On the distinction between convergence and divergence and their relation 
to creativity, see also L. Hudson, The Question of Creativity, in CREATIVITY, supra note 
141, at 217-34. 
 151. WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 73. 




Another example is imagination—a factor that is an integral part of 
the thinking process.  Jed Rubenfeld claims that imagination makes 
people “go beyond” what they know to be present.152  He discusses the 
interplay between imagination and copyright and argues that the current 
interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act conflicts with the human 
freedom of imagination enshrined in the First Amendment.  He remarks: 
Imagination ought to be free.  This should be First Amendment bedrock: No one 
may be penalized for what he dares to imagine.  What a person can imagine, he 
may imagine. 
But what is imagination, and what is its relationship to speech? 
. . . .  
Imagination comes in many forms: intellectual, visual, emotional, musical, and 
so on.  There are probably as many forms of imagination as there are forms of 
apprehending the world.  To define is to confine, and imagination resists 
confinement. 
But if we want to unite the various forms of imagination under one heading, we 
might begin by saying that to imagine is to conceive what isn’t there.  To 
imagine is to form an idea that goes beyond—that introduces something new 
to—what the mind has heretofore seen, heard, thought, or otherwise sensed.  
Imagination is the faculty by which the mind presents to itself what isn’t 
actually present and what has never been actually present to it.153
I agree that imagination involves distinct mental and emotional 
processes unique to the individual.  They take part in the creation of 
something that is not there—something new.  But imagination alone 
cannot trigger creative expressions.  If imagination and the thinking 
process are to be taken into account in the copyright making process, 
then they should not be distinguished from any other transformative 
quality.  The capacities to think and imagine are perhaps innate, but their 
developed and actual expression, which transforms the capacity into an 
actual talent that takes part in the copyright making process, is a social 
creature that depends on collective cultural and social properties. 
2.  The Limited Role of Innateness 
Innate endowment plays a role in my argument.  However, this role is 
limited.  Although I argue that copyrighted endeavours are a joint 
enterprise between authors and the public, I agree that the law should 
maintain a scheme of private rights in copyright due, inter alia, to the 
subjective contribution of authors, which represents their innate constitution 
and transformative abilities. 
 152. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 
112 YALE L.J. 1, 37 (2002). 
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke examines 
the nature of knowledge.154  He forcefully dismisses the possibility of 
having innate ideas and principles from epistemology and the philosophy of 
mind.155  A Lockean labourer cannot be said to create something ex 
nihilo or totally original, though he can be said to improve that which 
God gave us in common.  Locke tells us that we are controlled by 
experience.  Our brain at birth is a blank slate and it is only experience 
that transforms blank slates into actual brains capable of absorbing 
knowledge and using it in the creative process.  In other words, “all we 
know about the world is what the world cares to tell us.”156  In the words 
of Locke: 
Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all 
Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished?  Whence comes it 
by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on 
it, with an almost endless variety?  Whence has it all the materials of Reason 
and Knowledge?  To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that all 
our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self.  Our 
Observation employ’d either about external, sensible Objects; or about the 
internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is 
that, which supplies our Understanding with all the materials of thinking. These 
two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can 
naturally have, do spring.157
We are, after all, as Locke says “sociable Creature[s].”158  We can 
transform our innate constitution into real abilities only when we interact 
in society.  In this way the public—the collective—joins the creative 
process, and contributes to authors’ capacity to internalize external 
social and cultural elements, then translate them to the language of 
copyright creation. 
There are many transformative abilities that are necessary for the 
author to realize his creative talent.  A good example is personality.  The 
creative personality is a special creature.  Creative individuals possess a 
unique set of characteristics.  They infuse their internal code, composed 
of inborn and adaptive capacities, into an external object.159  As the U.S. 
 154. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. 
Nidditch ed., 1975) (1690) [hereinafter ESSAY].  All subsequent references to the ESSAY 
are by book, chapter, and section (for example, ESSAY, bk. VI, ch. XVI, § 2). 
 155. ESSAY, bk. I. 
 156. Empiricism, in OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 72, at 226. 
 157. ESSAY, supra note 154, bk. II, ch. I, § 2. 
 158. Id. at bk. III, ch. I, § 1. 
 159. This reminds me the words of Hegel, who claimed, “Attainments, erudition,  
talents  and  so  forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and 




Supreme Court remarked in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Company, originality denotes the “personal reaction of the individual 
upon nature.”160  If the way one expresses one’s personality is by a 
reaction to the environment, then personality is a transformative entity 
which needs the external environment for its realization.  Expressions of 
personality represent the author’s ability to interact in society, style, 
flexibility of mind, willingness to consider unusual possibilities, willingness 
to respond to the collective’s invitation to consume its cultural and social 
capital, ability to attack greater or more difficult problems, dedication to 
a quest for ultimate meanings, and other related elements.  Only 
exposure to social realities and absorption of collective properties 
promote attainment and actualization of these traits. 
There are different creative personalities.  Painters, for example, may 
have a great capacity to process and store visual information.  They 
might not, however, possess the respective qualities necessary to design 
the future extension to the Guggenheim Museum or the London 2012 
Olympic Village.  That is, we consume and internalize collective properties 
in different ways; we transform collective properties by adding to them 
from our subjective abilities, personality, and judgment.  In this way we 
create a work that reflects our contribution; we create an entity that 
presents our unique internal constitution. 
I do not suggest that collective social dependence, the principle of 
social construction, or causal factors alone create copyright, and I am 
certainly not of the opinion that the public alone initiates the creative 
impulse and its eventual creative expressions.  I believe that authorial 
knowledge and creativity are definable on two complementary grounds: 
collective and subjective.  The latter includes the limited use of innate 
qualities, common sense and reaction, and making judgments and 
inferences concerning aspects of experience that matter to us.  The former 
relates to the contribution from the public.  Interaction between the 
collective and the subjective is what makes copyright production real.  It 
is a game of managing contribution from two sources for the sake of 
control and power.  However, in the current state of affairs in copyright, 
only one source—the author—realizes that sense of control and reward. 
This practice of denial dominates our copyright culture.  It exposes the 
fallacy in establishing principles of copyright protection on the claim 
that what authors create is their “own intellectual creation”—a language 
not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody them in something 
external and alienate them. . . .” HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 41 (T.M. Knox trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821). 
 160. Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho. Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
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favored in contemporary European copyright laws.161  Authors, artists, 
composers, dramatists, scientists, and intellectual property scholars, 
including historic path-breaking figures, are individuals whose expressive 
knowledge and creative labour depend on traditions and consumption of 
collectively produced and owned social and cultural properties vested in 
distinctive authorial and other representations.  None can establish a 
claim for an exclusive property right based on the argument that he 
created something that represents his “own intellectual creation.” 
Before examining particular incidents, it is useful to look at a related 
example that illustrates the collective role and the limits of innateness: 
celebrities’ rights.  Arguments about celebrity magnetism vary from 
considering it to be public property and part of popular culture to an 
exclusive property of the persona.  Justine Hughes argues, “Property 
rights in the persona give the individual the economic value derived 
most directly from one’s personality.  As long as an individual identifies 
with his personal image, he will have a personality stake in that 
image.”162  Michael Madow rejects this view and contends: 
A celebrity . . . does not make her public image, her meaning for others, in 
anything like the way a carpenter makes a chair from a block of wood.  She is 
not the sole and sovereign “author” of what she means for others. . . . [A] 
celebrity like Madonna cannot say of her public image what the carpenter can 
say of his chair: “I made it.”  And because she cannot say this of her public 
image, she cannot lay a convincing moral claim to the exclusive ownership or 
control of the economic values that attach to it.163
Coombe takes this approach one step further and argues that the 
celebrity’s “successful image is frequently a form of cultural bricolage 
that improvises with a social history of symbolic forms.”164  A “celebrity 
 161. This ideal has recently become a principle of contemporary European 
copyright protection and illustrates the inherent danger in adhering to it.  Three European 
Community directives provide for a definition of originality as “the author’s own 
intellectual creation.”  See Council Directive 91/250, On the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 44 (EC); Council Directive 93/98, 
Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 6, 
1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 12 (EC); Council Directive 96/9, On the Legal Protection of 
Databases, art. 3, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 25 (EC). 
 162. Hughes, supra note 54, at 340-41. 
 163. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 195-96 (1993). 
 164. Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern 
Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 370 (1991). On 
this issue generally, see Hazel Carty, Advertising, Publicity Rights and English Law, 3 
INTELL. PROP. Q. 209 (2004). 




is authored in a multiplicity of sites of discursive practice, and that in the 
process, unauthorized identities are produced, both for the celebrity and 
for her diverse authors.”165  In another article Coombe asserts,  “Publicity 
rights arguably enable celebrities, their assignees, and their estates to 
control the meaning of the celebrity image in a fashion that deprives us 
of access to our collective cultural heritage . . . .”166  What this Article 
strives to defend is how copyrighted commodities are “authored in a 
multiplicity of sites of discursive practice” and represent “our collective 
cultural heritage.” 
In the next Part I shall take several examples of key authors and artists 
who have had an undeniable impact on our culture.  The examples I 
choose confirm the public authorial role and show the limits of authors’ 
abilities and the ubiquity of the public in the creative act.  They also 
clarify who the public is for purposes of the public authorship model.  I 
shall refer to “the public” as an entity comprising: (1) other individual 
contributors, except the principal author, who do not show individual 
intention to share the property in the work created and do not participate 
in the very creation of the particular copyrighted work, and (2) the 
general public via its collective authorial contribution and provision of 
social and cultural properties. 
I will progress chronologically, and show that there is no difference 
between figures whose original works were not protected under 
copyright laws and others whose works represent living examples of the 
flaws in our copyright regime.  I shall discuss Shakespeare, Mozart, 
Picasso, chance creations and indeterminate works of Dadaist artists and 
conclude that recognition of the public authorial contribution, if less 
relevant in pre-copyright law periods, will ensure equity in modern 
copyright and secure society’s social structure and collective cultural 
identity in today’s copyright regime.  These examples will also show 
that the “copyright moment”—the moment in which copyrighted entities 
are born—is not the individual’s moment but the moment which marks 
the birth of work emerging from the collaboration between authors and 
the public. 
VII.  THE MYTH OF AUTHORSHIP, THE REALITY OF CONTINUITY 
A.  Shakespeare, the Co-Author 
A title such as Shakespeare, Co-Author167 almost says it all.  In his 
book, Brian Vickers challenges the view that authorial and artistic 
 165. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity, supra note 164, at 365. 
 166. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics, supra note 13, at 1876. 
 167. VICKERS, supra note 3. 
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creativity is an expression of a solitary creative outburst.  Shakespeare’s 
works predate the Statute of Anne of 1709.168  That means neither 
Shakespeare, nor his heirs, could have imagined the benefits of copyright 
protection.  As David Vaver remarks: “Were Shakespeare still in 
copyright, his heirs could prevent the publication of Charles and Mary 
Lamb’s Tales from Shakespeare (1807) for children, and other 
reductions such as the half-hour version of Macbeth mounted in 1994 by 
the Waterside Theatre Company of Stratford.”169  However, a “fresh 
translation of Shakespeare or Voltaire has full copyright protection for 
the translator’s life plus 50 years whether the source work is that of a 
living author or not.”170
In Shakespeare, Co-Author, Vickers asks, “How much do we know 
about Shakespeare’s collaborations with other dramatists?”171 He 
examines five plays and finds each to be co-authored with another 
person, including: Fletcher’s substantial contributions to Henry VIII and 
The Two Nobel Kinsmen, Peele’s co-authorship of Titus Andronicus, and 
the evidence amassed for Middleton’s unquestionably substantial share 
in Timon of Athens.172  The test Vickers employs is composed of several 
components including: the verse style, parallel passages, the vocabulary 
used, linguistic choices, and function words used to convey special 
meanings.173  In Titus Andronicus Vickers finds “typical” authorial style 
 168. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1968) 
(discussing the Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19).  William Shakespeare lived from 
1564 to 1616.  See DENNIS KAY, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: HIS LIFE AND TIMES, at xvii-xviii 
(1995). 
 169. David Vaver, Abridgements and Abstracts: Copyright Implications, 17 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 225, 232 (1995). 
 170. David Vaver, Translation and Copyright: A Canadian Focus, 16 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 159, 160-61 (1994).  However, the basic depiction of a character is not 
subject to copyright protection.  This may be illustrated by Justice Learned Hand’s  
decision in the case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures where he uses the example that if 
Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night was subject to copyright, then the creation of a character 
who was “a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household” would 
not be enough to infringe copyright, and “the less developed the character, the less they 
can be copyrighted . . . .”  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 
1930). 
 171. VICKERS, supra note 3, at vii. The fact that collaborative authorship was a 
standard practice in Elizabethan, Jacobean, and Caroline drama convinces Vickers that 
we can find clear traces of co-authorship in Shakespeare’s plays.  Id. at 137-47. 
 172. See discussions of Henry VIII, id. at 333; The Two Nobel Kinsmen, id. at 402; 
Titus Andonicus, id. at 148; and Timon of Athens, id. at 244; see also id. at 291 
(discussing Pericles). 
 173. Id. at 44-98; see also id. at 98-134 (discussing problems in identifying and 
monitoring co-authors). 




by George Peele despite the fact that many Shakespearian scholars seem 
“to exclude acknowledging the presence of another author” in the 
play.174  The play was entered in the Stationers’ Register in 1594 as “a 
book inituled a Nobel Roman Historye of Titus Andronicus.”175
Scholars have found similarities between Titus, Hamlet, and King 
Lear, pointing to Shakespearean development in tragedy.  In contrast, 
Vickers finds a strong case for co-authorship in Titus between Shakespeare 
and Peele.  He examines three things: (1) comparison between Titus and 
a play by Peele of comparable subject matter, The Battle of Alcazar;176 
(2) the use of alliteration;177 and (3) the number of vocatives.178  He 
concludes that “Peele was no doubt a useful co-author for Shakespeare, 
with his longer theatrical experience and greater knowledge of the 
classical world . . . .”179  His contribution to Titus is “enough to gain Peele 
recognition as co-author.”180  He reaches similar conclusions with regards to 
Wilkins’s contribution to Pericles181 and Fletcher’s contribution to 
Henry VIII 182 and The Two Noble Kinsmen.183  Concerning Shakespeare’s 
tragedy, Timon of Athens, Vickers takes his view on co-authorship even 
further and argues that all the methods employed to test the originality of 
the play “agree in assigning to Middleton a substantial part of Timon, 
and Shakespearians who continue to deny this point risk forfeiting their 
scholarly credibility.”184
Shakespeare’s influence on the evolution of legal reasoning is an 
interesting phenomenon in itself.  For example, one commentator complains 
about the limited use courts make of Shakespearean quotations.185  Some 
references quote him as an authority supporting a certain activity of life 
and others go further and use him as an authority to establish the 
meaning of contemporary legal terms.186  If we want to refer to Shakespeare 
 174. Id. at 162. 
 175. Id. at 148. 
 176. Id. at 219. 
 177. Id. at 220-26. 
 178. Id. at 226-29. 
 179. Id. at 243. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 316. 
 182. Id. at 336-47, 396, 402. 
 183. Id. at 428, 432. 
 184. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).  Claims that William Shakespeare was not the 
author of the plays for which he is known as their author exist.  See, e.g., John Paul 
Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373 
(1992).  The name “Shakespeare” itself is allegedly borrowed.  Id. at 1375.
 185. Jules Gleicher, The Bard at Bar: Some Citations of Shakespeare by the United 
States Supreme Court, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 327 (2001). 
 186. Id.  Moreover, Shakespeare, as one commentator argues, must have had 
sophisticated legal knowledge.  Thomas Regnier, Comment, Could Shakespeare Think 
Like a Lawyer? How Inheritance Law Issues in Hamlet May Shed Light on the 
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in legal discourse, should we not learn a lesson from Shakespeare’s 
mode of collaboration when we develop standards of copyright protection?  
Scholarship on copyright is attentive to the collaborative nature of 
Shakespeare’s works.  In a leading source on the evolution of copyright, 
Rose supports the criticism on the “unoriginal” nature of Shakespeare’s 
plays and remarks: 
As a member of the King’s Men and a shareholder in the Globe Theatre, 
Shakespeare participated in a collaborative and traditional enterprise of cultural 
production.  Almost none of Shakespeare’s stories were original with him. . . .  
It would not be wholly inappropriate, I think, to characterize Shakespeare the 
playwright, though not Shakespeare the author of the sonnets and poems, in a 
quasi-medieval manner as a reteller of tales.187
And Madison, questioning Shakespeare’s originality in the context of 
authorship, writes: 
In Shakespeare in Love the screenwriter Tom Stoppard (with collaborator Marc 
Norman) uses “Romeo and Ethel, the Pirate’s Daughter” as the working title of 
the play that becomes “Romeo and Juliet,” not only to mock the notion that 
Shakespeare composed his plays as a sole “romantic” author but to remind us of 
the sometimes messy, unplanned, accidental, idiosyncratic nature of creativity 
and creation.  It has been long recognised that Shakespeare borrowed shamelessly, 
from contemporaries, fellow actors, Anglo-Saxon literature, and Roman historians 
and playwrights.  What we do not know is how purposive or fortuitous this 
process was.  Likewise, in connection with copyright, we do not often ask 
whether the notion of authorship matters.  We know . . . that authorship shapes 
the character of copyright law.  But does authorship shape what copyright law 
cares about—the creative work of authorship?188
In the definition of “the public” I include both previous generations of 
creative geniuses, collaboration with other fellow artists except the 
principal creator, and the general public.  That is, authors and artists do 
not create in a social vacuum.  They are influenced by special circumstances, 
collective and personal, social and cultural experiences, and other endless 
untraceable processes.  For example, Norwich examines the close 
relationship between Shakespeare’s plays, societal events, and characters 
Authorship Question, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 427-28 (2003).  Ironically, could it be 
that the person who wrote Shakespeare was a lawyer, and still demands “let’s kill all the 
lawyers.”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 2, 
sc. 2. 
 187. ROSE, supra note 25, at 25-26.  To this Rose mentions two exceptions: the 
epilogue to 2 Henry IV and the epilogue to Henry V.  Id. at 26; see also id. at 122-23. 
 188. Madison, supra note 135, at 760. 




dominating his period.189  Likewise, Vickers did not only refer to the 
individualistic contribution by Shakespeare’s fellow dramatists but to the 
contribution from a community of dramatists and the public at large.  He 
asserts that “language change has a social dimension.  The key point is 
that linguistic innovations are mostly made by an educated class, responsive 
to outside influences and to social change.”190  And that examination of 
authorial collaboration “allows us to trace the development of knowledge, 
as each generation of scholars builds on their predecessors’ work, 
correcting and extending it.”191  There are two parts in this statement, 
attesting to the unavoidable interplay between the collective and subjective 
sublimes in copyright creation: first, every dramatist’s knowledge is 
dependent on the contribution of other dramatists and the contribution of 
the public by virtue of being a member of a given social structure; 
second, the individual dramatist uses his innate endowment and acquired 
knowledge “correcting and extending” it in a way that makes him eligible to 
claim recognition of his own authorial contribution. 
B.  Compositional Ingenuity and Mozart  
Contrary to the claim of the Romantic composers that their works 
suddenly sprung whole into consciousness, compositions only gradually 
take their final form, not without the aid of the collective.  It was found 
that there is a significant correlation between optimal experience and the 
creative output of student compositions.192  Mozart was a student in 
many senses.  He, who most of us would consider the ultimate example 
of a musical genius, was influenced by experiences, and his works owe 
much to other composers.193
Mozart’s musical “inventions” were influenced and triggered by many 
external factors.  Besides his extensive travels and ordinary life experiences, 
masterpieces composed by Mozart are based on musical achievements of 
others.  For example, his three E-flat concertos for the French horn were 
modeled on horn concertos by Antoni Rosetti; his early symphonies 
 189. JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, SHAKESPEARE’S KINGS: THE GREAT PLAYS AND THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN THE MIDDLE AGES: 1337-1485 (1999). 
 190. VICKERS, supra note 3, at 119 (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. at 147. 
 192. Charles Byrne et al., Assessing Creativity in Musical Compositions: Flow as 
an Assessment Tool, 20 BRIT. J. MUSIC EDUC. 277 (2003).  Optimal experience, or “flow” 
is the “the effortless involvement with everyday life and may occur when a person is 
engaged in absorbing and enjoyable activities.”  Id. at 279; see also Susan O’Neill, Flow 
Theory and the Development of Musical Performance Skills, 141 BULL. COUNCIL FOR 
RES. MUSIC EDUC. 129 (1999). 
 193. Erich Hertzmann, Mozart’s Creative Process, in THE CREATIVE WORLD OF 
MOZART 17, 25-26 (Paul Henry Lang ed., 1991). 
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written in London (1764-65) mimic the style of Johann Christian Bach.194  
Objective evidence indicates that his compositions did not come to 
Mozart complete.  The compositions are so unromantic, as we use the 
term in copyright discourse, to even bring musicologists who have 
studied “Mozart’s letter” to conclude that his compositional style is a 
forgery.195
I do not intend to accuse Mozart of unoriginal compositional input, 
but I certainly believe that his dependence on other sources would prove 
ample enough to curtail copyright ownership even in today’s music 
industry.  Although from a more individualistic approach, Lawrence 
Becker takes the example of Mozart and reaffirms that a creative 
musical composition is a mix of what is already known and resides in 
the public domain and the subjective contribution of the composer: 
Think of trying to give a complete, transitive casual account of the composition 
of Mozart’s Don Giovanni that makes Mozart himself simply an intermediate 
link.  Every note, voicing, key change, or tempo would have to be explained by 
events “outside” Mozart.  We certainly cannot give such an explanation, and we 
commonly think none exists—while we can find evidence of influences, 
tendencies, exigencies outside the composer that are part of a full explanation, 
another substantial part simply begins with Mozart’s creative activity.196
Artists, composers, and poets all possess the great mastery of artistic, 
musical, or poetic phraseology.  They have in themselves the ability to 
create unique properties that represent elements from their original 
makeup, subjective experience and unique personality.  This does not 
mean that artistic personalities are acquainted with such abilities from 
which complete originals are created.  If a composer, for example, 
“continues to work exercises in imitation of his models he will be 
surprised to find that along with the thousand subtleties of technique he 
will absorb from his masters, he will discover the personal materials of 
 194. WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 225-26. 
 195. Id. at 46.  The composer Bach is another good example that composition 
necessitates reliance on others’ works and resources.  See NORMAN CARRELL, BACH THE 
BORROWER 227-364 (1967).  Borrowing allows the making of variations on existing 
musical templates, and there are many examples for successful borrowing, such as 
Brahms’s Variations on a Theme by Haydn and Beethoven’s Diabelli Variation. 
WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 230. 
 196. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 609, 614 (1993). 




his own art.”197  As Mozart relates about himself in one of his letters, 
while rejecting the ideal of originality: 
When I proceed to write down my ideas, I take out of the bag of my 
memory . . . . But why my productions take from my hand that particular form 
and style that makes them Mozartish, and different from the works of other 
composers, is probably owing to the same cause which renders my nose so or so 
large, so aquiline, or, in short, makes it Mozart’s, and different from those of 
other people.  For I really do not study or aim at any originality . . . .198
The same method of musical composition holds for different 
contemporary music styles.  For example, composing blues music is 
complex and relies, to a large extent, on collectively produced social and 
cultural properties, tradition, and borrowing from others’ works.  Siva 
Vaidhyanathan observes: 
The blues compositional ethic is complex and synergistic, relying on 
simultaneously exploring and extending the common elements of the tradition.  
Blues artists are rewarded for punctuation within collaboration, distinction 
within a community, and an ability to touch a body of signs shared among all 
members of an audience.199
C.  Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon and Guernica 
Picasso’s works, as opposed to Shakespeare’s and Mozart’s, are 
protected under the 1976 Copyright Act and European legislation until 
2043.200  Two of Picasso’s artistic achievements, the paintings Les 
Demoiselles d’Avignon and Guernica, are considered by the artistic 
community, art historians, and those who study the psychology of the 
creative act, to represent a radical departure in art and prime examples of 
the transcendence of creative thinking in the arts. 
Picasso painted Les Demoiselles d’Avignon in 1907.201  The grotesque 
appearance and sexual poses of the five women in the painting 
(originally part of seven—two men were omitted from the final version) 
are intended to repel the viewer and perhaps to provide him with some 
hidden insight into Picasso’s sexual life.  The women are prostitutes and 
the setting is an Avignon Street brothel in Barcelona’s red-light district.  
The final painting, which looks totally original, was discovered to 
 197. Harold Shapero, The Musical Mind, in THE CREATIVE PROCESS 49, 52 
(Brewster Ghiselin ed., 1952). 
 198. EDWARD HOLMES, THE LIFE OF MOZART 256 (Ernest Rhys ed., 1912) (second 
emphasis added). 
 199. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 121 (2001). 
 200. Pablo Picasso lived from 1881 to 1973.  See sources cited supra note 71. 
 201. This case study is discussed in WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 193-209.  See 
also PIERRE DAIX, PICASSO 11-36 (Dorothy S. Blair trans., Thames & Hudson Ltd. 
1979); TIMOTHY HILTON, PICASSO 60-93 (1975). 
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embody existing artistic patterns and motifs.  X-ray analysis of earlier 
sketches reveals that two cycles of painting were undertaken. 
Picasso’s work is still considered radical.  The asymmetric faces and 
bodies of the women were new and unfamiliar to those equipped to 
evaluate beauty and culture in paintings.  The inspiration for the women’s 
oval-shaped faces, with large lozenge-shaped eyes, large scrolled ears, 
and flat noses came from an exhibition of antique Iberian reliefs held at 
the Louvre museum in Paris in the spring of 1906.  This “had led him 
to a greater emancipation from objective appearances . . . .”202  Two 
features that particularly struck the attention of the art community were 
the women’s large ears and the flat noses of two demoiselles that stand 
in the center of the painting.  The source of the ears is two antique 
statues that Picasso acquired in 1907.  The nose, as Picasso himself tells 
us, was taken from a painting by Henri Matisse which he also obtained 
in 1907. 
The Iberian phase of the painting was reflected in the first cycle.  In 
the second cycle, Picasso modified his work extensively after his visit 
to an ethnographic museum that displayed works of primitive art.  
Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon also incorporates features from 
other artists’ paintings and African art and is conceived by art historians 
as a response to other styles evident at that time.203  For example, a flat 
nose was already found in Matisse’s Portrait of Marquerite and 
distorted bodies were found in works by Cézanne and Matisse.204  A year 
prior to the completion of Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, Matisse painted 
the Le Bonheur de Vivre (The Joy of Life); the scene is not less sexual 
than Picasso’s brothel.  Some consider Les Demoiselles d’Avignon to be a 
negative response to Matisse’s painting, which portrayed a tranquil 
scene. 
 202. DAIX, supra note 201, at 30. 
 203. HILTON, supra note 201, at 60-62. 
 204. So influential were Cézanne and African art on Picasso that six or seven years 
after completing Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, he concentrated on Cézanne and African 
art.  DAIX, supra note 201, at 30. 









Overall theme and scene 
Style of preliminary work 
The two women seated at right 
The two women seated at centre 
Cézanne, Matisse, Derain 
Picasso’s “Iberian” period 
Cézanne 





Change in orientation and number 
of characters; removal of men 
Non-Iberian flat noses 
Non-Iberian scrolled ears 
Distortions 
Picasso’s evaluation of painting 
 
Matisse’s Portrait of Marguerite 
Sculpture 
Exposure to primitive art 
 
 
Thirty years after painting Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, Picasso painted 
Guernica—“a cherished museum piece.”206  The bombing of the Spanish 
City of Guernica during the Civil War in Spain was the trigger for the 
painting.  This work has become a symbol of the suffering of the Spanish 
people under the former dictator, Francisco Franco.  The symbolic 
importance of the work was enhanced by Picasso’s decision to loan it to 
the Museum of Modern Art in New York until democracy was restored 
in Spain.  Guernica was returned to Spain after forty years in exile and 
eight years after Picasso’s death.  The final Guernica embodies artistic 
methods and features from other artists of the time.207  It benefited 
 
 205. Adapted from a table in WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 201. 
 206. HERBERT MARCUSE, TECHNOLOGY, WAR, AND FASCISM 201 (Douglas Kellner 
ed., 1998).  See generally WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 202-09. 
 207. As Blunt explains: 
[W]e are told that Picasso changes his style so frequently and so rapidly that no 
one would realize that works of different periods were by the same artist.  But 
what art historian—if he did not know the intervening stages—could guess that 
early and late works by Titian, Rembrandt, Poussin, or Cézanne were by the 
same hand?  And if, with Picasso, one carries out the process of following 
through the intervening stages, it becomes apparent that, although the first and 
last productions of his imagination are widely separated—even fundamentally 
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from Picasso’s experience of the war and was also influenced by the 
Spanish artist, Francisco de Goya.  This influence is evident from 
examination of several preliminary sketches of the painting.  Furthermore, 
research by Fisch affirms that Picasso, in 1937, used a woodcut by Hans 
Baldung Grien, The Bewitched Stable-Lad, as a model for Guernica 
which came to his attention from a catalogue on Fantastic Art Dada 
Surrealism from the Museum of Modern Art in New York.208
A key feature in the copyright making process is continuity between 
old and new ideas: “In order to be realistic, creative ideas need to be 
structured, and that structure needs to have evolved from previously 
established ideas and principles.”209  Continuity in Picasso’s Guernica, 
Ronald Finke observes, is a good example that “[e]ven when a new idea 
consists of extensive transformations of previous ideas, one should still 
be able to discover a connective path that links the structures.”210 The 
operation in two cycles of Les Demoiselles d’Avignon and the social 
history of painting Guernica reveal the limits of our innate abilities, the 
dependence on the contribution of the collective, and the causal 
connection between the contribution of the public and Picasso’s 
contribution. 
Rosemary Coombe also takes Picasso as an example and claims that 
his personality has been very much influenced by the collective. 
Coombe shows that collectively produced entities, such as cultural 
elements produced for social reasons, were borrowed by Picasso and 
found their way to his paintings and became part of his personality: 
“When a primitive statue, produced in a collectivity for social reasons, 
makes its way into a Picasso painting, the statue itself may still embody 
the identity of the culture from which it sprang, but any reproduction of 
different—the change was brought about by a series of steps, each of which is 
intelligible and can be seen as following logically on the earlier moves, and 
each of which was arrived at by a process of experiment and thought . . . . 
ANTHONY BLUNT, PICASSO’S ‘GUERNICA’ 2 (1969). 
 208. EBERHARD FISCH, GUERNICA BY PICASSO 103 (James Hotchkiss trans., Associated 
Univ. Press 1988). 
 209. Ronald A. Finke, Creative Realism, in THE CREATIVE COGNITION APPROACH, 
supra note 141, at 303, 304. Gifford, discussing movements in artistic development, 
writes: “Despite the evolution of artistic subject matter, the broad-based movements 
themselves are best understood as a continuous progression of developmental stages 
reflecting back on earlier periods.”  Daniel J. Gifford, Innovation and Creativity in the 
Fine Arts: The Relevance and Irrelevance of Copyright, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
569, 582 (2000). 
 210. Ronald A. Finke, Creative Realism, in THE CREATIVE COGNITION APPROACH, 
supra note 141, at 304. 




it is legally recognised as the embodiment of Picasso’s authorial 
personality.”211  The copyright community continues to devalue the 
contribution of collective properties for the development of personality 
and their impact on the transformation of innate abilities necessary for 
the creation of art.  This tendency borders on absurdity: the law isolates 
the person from the social and cultural context and rewards it for giving 
the world an original object. 
There is a story about an interview of Picasso in his maturity during 
which he was asked why he spent so much time imitating the style of 
great masters of art.  He replied, “If I had not imitated them I would 
have to spend the rest of my life imitating myself.”212  In another 
interview he remarked, “At the beginning of each picture there is 
someone who works with me.  Towards the end I have the impression of 
having worked without a collaborator.”213  Picasso undoubtedly ventured 
beyond the works of his predecessors “but even he recognised that 
without mastering the best achievements of a domain, one is left only 
with one’s naked talents, having to reinvent the wheel without tools.”214
D.  Dada Art and Chance Creations 
A still open question is whether “chance creations” or randomly generated 
works are subject to the critique I presented above.  Our artistic traditions 
are reflective of a broad spectrum of tastes and attitudes towards art and 
what it should be.  Modern copyright laws do not embrace a rigid 
qualitative test for authorship and leave the question whether a given 
work constitutes art, or whether it is sufficiently creative to merit copyright 
protection, to the audience.  It is beyond the scope of the present Article 
to discuss whether quantification of creative content should become a 
threshold for copyright protection, more than the mere requirement for a 
“modicum of creativity.”  However, an intriguing question that deserves 
some attention is whether anyone can claim an indeterminate work 
negates the social dependence argument and lacks significant causal 
connection to collectively produced and owned properties. 
 211. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, supra note 13, at 
225. 
 212. Christian Zervos, Conversation with Picasso, in THE CREATIVE PROCESS, supra 
note 197, at 55, 57. 
 213. Id. (emphasis added). 
 214. CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 141, at 421-22. 
ZEMER 8-8-06.DOC 9/6/2006  1:59 PM 
[VOL. 43:  247, 2006]  The Copyright Moment 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 299 
 
Jean Arp and Marcel Duchamp are noted Dadaist artists.215  Arp is 
known for collages arranged by the “law of chance.”216  He attempts to 
create without-sense—a “flight into the Romantic or mystical model 
which functions as an alternative, as a utopia, promising a release from 
the unstable and unsatisfactory present.”217  Being unsatisfied with his 
inability to produce a drawing to his liking, Arp tore paper into small 
pieces allowing them to fall onto canvas and attaching them where they 
fell.  He then saw the composition he wanted to draw in the chance 
arrangement of the scraps.  He also composed poems by the principle of 
chance.  He randomly chose words and phrases mainly taken from 
newspapers.  Duchamp, like Arp, is famous for his “chance operations.”   
Duchamp “use[s] the confusion of modernity as a way of sweeping away 
the old structures.”218  In one instance he allowed dust to settle on a glass 
for several months, and after being photographed, was wiped off 
everywhere but the cone areas where it was affixed with glue and made 
part of the work.219
Arp and Duchamp created collages by the principle of chance, which 
“allows itself to be easily combined with the Dada concern with everyday 
life and media, creating an art of chaotic juxtapositions.”220  Indubitably, 
the chaotic collages made by Arp and Duchamp went beyond what was 
already known.  But, is there any noticeable role for collectively 
produced social and cultural properties in collages made by the principle 
of chance?  Mark Pegrum observes that the Dada style is a postmodern 
reaction to modernity.  Duchamp, for example, “challenges utilitarianism 
via his ready-mades such as the bicycle wheel, which represents a very 
old and very basic machine, now transposed into the aesthetic sphere and 
thus rendered completely useless in terms of its original purpose.”221  
Although it looks as if Dadaists are purely pro-chaos in the name of 
liberty, Arp “accept[s] chaos but as the locus of a higher order and 
 215. See generally FRANCIS M. NAUMANN & BETH VENN, MAKING MISCHIEF: DADA 
INVADES NEW YORK (1996); MARK A. PEGRUM, CHALLENGING MODERNITY: DADA 
BETWEEN MODERN AND POSTMODERN 245-49 (2000).  For Pegrum’s brief definition of 
Dada art, see id. at 309-11.  See also Durham, supra note 18, at 596-608. 
 216. PEGRUM, supra note 215, at 245-49; see also Jane Hancock, Arp’s Chance 
Collages, in DADA/DIMENSIONS (Stephen C. Foster ed., 1985), cited in Durham, supra 
note 18, at 597. 
 217. PEGRUM, supra note 215, at 39. 
 218. Id. at 100. 
 219. Durham, supra note 18, at 599; PEGRUM, supra note 215, at 246. 
 220. PEGRUM, supra note 215, at 246. 
 221. Id. at 98. 




meaning, which effectively amounts to a rejection of the unstructured 
and meaningless nature of that chaos.”222  That does not mean that the 
Dadaist reaction is created in isolation from the authorial collectivity. 
Pegrum observes that there is an unavoidable link between postmodernism 
and Romanticism and the former may even seem an extension of the 
Romantic cultural stream.  If this is so, “Is postmodernism in effect a 
radicalised version of the Romantic assault on modernity? And what of 
Dada’s relation to Romanticism?”223  Pegrum, believes that the Dadaist 
is a “daffier version of the lonely [R]omantic rebel.”224  That is, the reaction 
to the external culture and social reality define the creative act in both 
streams.  Arp does not negate the beauty of accidental art but remarks 
that even in the case of accidental art, the artist has still to be attentive to 
external influences: “Arp explained elsewhere that accidents alone could 
not produce art; art required the imprint of human aspirations.”225
Arp and Duchamp unquestionably express their personalities through 
their revolutionary works and display a high degree of imagination.  
That is, even if indeterminate works are created in a random fashion—the 
kind of works that the courts may seem most reluctant to consider 
original—they can never be created in isolation from the contribution of 
the collective.  They react against certain attitudes of the public and as 
such the raw materials they use are but collectively produced symbols 
and characters and other cultural and social properties.  Their creative 
abilities are transformative abilities; they are not, in any way, innate.  
The imprint of the public’s authorial role is evident in the method in 
which Dada artists express their artistic personality. 
Weisberg makes a distinction between creativity and creative value. 
He offers a definition of creativity and asserts that, “for a product to be 
called creative, it must be the novel result of goal-directed activity; 
novelty brought about by accident would not qualify as creative, no 
matter how valuable the outcome.”226  In the post-Feist copyright era, 
creativity is about value.  As opposed to the United States, English 
copyright law does not require creativity for copyright protection.227  
 222. Id. at 99. 
 223. Id. at 100. 
 224. Id. (citation omitted). 
 225. Durham, supra note 18, at 597 n.168, quoting Hancock, supra note 216, at 65.  
The Second Circuit already noted, in a case considering unplanned variations as a source 
of authorship, “Many great scientific discoveries have resulted from accidents . . . .”  
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 n.25 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 226. WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 242-43. Weisberg then offers “assessment by 
members of the field” as indicative of the value.  Id. at 246. 
 227. In the United Kingdom, courts remain steadfast to the formula of “skill, 
judgement and labour” as the basic condition for copyright protection.  See, e.g., 
Ladbrooke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 All E.R. 465; 
Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Servs. Ltd. v. Wilf Gilbert (Staffordshire) Ltd. 
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Both systems, however, allow accidental art to flourish and permit wide 
discretion in defining what art is, as long as the given work has authorial 
origins.  Under English copyright law the works of Arp and Duchamp 
can be protected, irrespective of artistic quality, if each qualifies as, for 
example, a collage.228  The addition of “collage” to the 1988 U.K. Act, 
Paul Kearns asserts, “accommodates non-motion visual art that may 
contain pre-created material by another but is so originally arranged as 
to gain its own copyright protection.”229  I do not reject the argument 
that authors of collages do not “put their mark” on their creation230 or the 
claim that their works represent some aspects of their inner personality.  
As the Bleistein decision tells us: “Personality always contains something 
unique.  It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very 
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s 
alone.”231  Arguably, if a chance creation resulted in a collage, which by 
any means is a complex artistic work, the work can be viewed as either 
more dependent on multiple, seemingly unrelated, sources, and thus 
more vulnerable to my arguments on the dependence on the authorial 
collectivity, or a truly extraordinary achievement.  Either way, Dada 
works originate in an artist and probably involve creative skill and 
labour and infusion of personality.  In fact, the many reproductions made 
of the works by Arp and Duchamp revive the truth in Justice Peterson’s 
maxim that “what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.”232
[1994] F.S.R. 723 (Ch.), available at http://www.westlaw.com (U.K. Case Law, Fleet 
Street Reports); Reject Shop Plc. v. Manners [1995] F.S.R. 870 (QB), available at 
http://www.westlaw.com (U.K. Case Law, Fleet Street Reports); Cala Homes (South) 
Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd. (No 1) [1995] F.S.R. 818 (Ch.), available at 
http://www.westlaw.com (U.K. Case Law, Fleet Street Reports); Bowater Windows Ltd. 
v. Aspen Windows Ltd. [1999] F.S.R. 759 (Ch.), available at http://www.westlaw.com 
(U.K. Case Law, Fleet Street Reports); IPC Magazines Ltd. v MGN Ltd. [1998] F.S.R. 
431 (Ch.), available at http://www.westlaw.com (U.K. Case Law, Fleet Street Reports); 
Hi-Tech Autoparts Ltd. v. Towergate Two Ltd. (No. 1) [2002] F.S.R. 15 (Patent County 
Ct.), available at http://www.westlaw.com (U.K. Case Law, Fleet Street Reports); 
Beckingham v. Hodgens [2002] EWHC 2143 Ch., [2003] F.S.R. 14; Sawkins v. 
Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 565, [2005] 3 All E.R. 636.   
 228. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 4(1)(a) (U.K.). 
 229. PAUL KEARNS, THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF ART 78 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 230. Mitel, Inc. v. Inqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1374 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 231. Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho. Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
 232. Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd., (1916) 2 Ch. 601, 610 
(U.K.).  Durham holds the view that the works of Arp and Duchamp qualify for 
the post-Feist definition of originality—they represent a modicum of creativity.  Durham, 
supra note 18, at 637-38. 




E.  Zapruder’s Copyright 
Chance creations may satisfy the conditions of originality and 
creativity, but how much can we stretch the conditions?  Take the 
example of photographs taken by sheer happenstance, but which have an 
incredible historic and social value.  Photographs taken by Zapruder of 
the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 
1963, and by Kampler of the late Prime Minister Rabin on November 4, 
1995, at the peace demonstration prior to his assassination, are 
protectable under copyright laws.  The former case was tested in Time, 
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.233
Abraham Zapruder, a Dallas dress manufacturer and amateur photographer, 
was present by sheer happenstance at the scene of the assassination of 
President Kennedy, and filmed it with his camera.  For the same reason 
that the photo of Oscar Wilde was found entirely representative of the 
photographer’s “original mental conception,”234  Zapruder’s work, one 
of the most important records of this horrific event, was granted copyright 
protection.  Interestingly, one may raise an objection to copyright on the 
basis of the impossible application of the idea/expression dichotomy: 
Zapruder had no idea prior to filming the event.  However, positioning 
the camera can be constructed as a “mental conception” just as randomly 
choosing materials for a collage or accidentally choosing keys on a 
music dice game. 
The questions whether Zapruder’s thirty second, eight millimeter strip 
of celluloid is a piece of art or a national treasure, or whether it should 
be protected under copyright law at all, are certainly interesting.  For that 
and many other reasons Congress enacted the “JFK Act”—the John F. 
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.235  However, 
should we wait three decades for Congress to listen to the public’s need 
for authentic information on the assassination of President Kennedy?  I 
assume Jessica Litman would respond to this question by raising the 
possibility of civil disobedience.  In one of her leading sources on 
copyright, Litman chronicles the many weaknesses of copyright and 
concludes with the proclamation, “People don’t obey laws that they 
 233. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Melanie Skehar, Who Really Owns 
the Zapruder Film After The JFK Act: The Sixteen Million Dollar Question, 34 SW. U. L. 
REV. 325 (2004).  See generally DAVID R. WRONE, THE ZAPRUDER FILM: REFRAMING 
JFK’S ASSASSINATION (2003).   
 234. Burrow-Giles Litho. Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
 235. President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 
U.S.C. § 2107 (2000).  The Act specifies that “all Government records concerning the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate 
disclosure, and all records should be eventually disclosed to enable the public to become 
fully informed about the history surrounding the assassination.”  Id. at § 2(a)(2). 
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don’t believe in.”236  She believes that public rejection of existing 
copyright policies will eventually persuade legislators to change the law.  
As opposed to Litman, I would leave civil disobedience as a last resort.  
Perhaps a better way to approach the massive expansion of copyright at 
the expense of the public interest is by bringing to the forefront of the 
public debate the role of the public in the creative process and its 
collective contribution to the creation of each and every copyrighted 
work—to tell the public: “you have a right to your authorial contribution.” 
The case of Zapruder illustrates the role of the creative collectivity.  
For example, photographic skills are not innate.  They are abilities that 
depend on experience, exposure to cultural and social realities, and 
consumption of collective properties.  I should not press this example 
any further, but say that it is a dramatic example of copyright protection 
in the category of nonartistic and noncreative works that received 
protection.  It illustrates that sometimes nothing, except minimal manual 
labour, is sufficient for copyright protection.  Whether happenstance and 
serendipity, judgement of merits, or a quality based test such as a 
modicum of creativity, none negates the sociality of the copyright 
creation process or discredits its dependence on collectively produced 
cultural and social properties. 
VIII.  THE COPYRIGHT MOMENT 
A.  Contrasting “Moments” 
What are the implications of the above discussion for the definition of 
copyright?  The main implication is the transformation of the “copyright 
moment,” that is, the moment in which the copyright entity is born; the 
moment after which the author is entitled to claim a property right in a 
given creation.  In the present state of affairs, the “copyright moment” is 
defined as the moment when one or more individuals collect ideas from 
the public domain and express them in a tangible medium.  It is the 
union of collectively owned, but unprotected, entities and the author’s 
personal contribution.  The joint enterprise is not different from the 
famous assertion by William Landes and Richard Posner that “the 
original work (novel or article) is the joint output of two types of input, 
 236. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 195 (2001); see also Jessica Litman, 
Ethical Disobedience, 5 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 217, 217 (2004). 




only one of which is protected by copyright law.”237  The “copyright 
moment,” as presently interpreted, assumes the creation of an 
independently created new entity of social wealth and allows the 
individual to enclose the whole object and exclusively add it to his 
private dominion.  This moment does not reflect reality and certainly does 
not accommodate fundamental social considerations.  It posits the 
individual as the entity responsible for making copyrighted materials, 
isolating him from the social matrix in which he creates.  It denies the 
collective contribution the public makes. 
Every individual has the desire, and deserves, to obtain recognition for 
his creative expressions.  However, being dependent on the contribution 
of the public means that one is unable to produce without this contribution. 
“Who owns this contribution?” is a question which I address in this 
Article.  It is the public in its collective capacity that creates, nurtures,  
and maintains this contribution.  Some form of ownership of this 
contribution is imperative for the preservation of peace and order.  As 
Harris remarks, “Peace and order required that most things should be 
in someone’s ownership. . . .”238  But that does not entail that private 
ownership is the only preferred form.  Collective ownership is also possible. 
Understanding the combination of contribution from two sources, 
authors and the public, changes the essence of the “copyright 
moment”—the moment in which person P becomes the original owner 
of object O.  There is no moment in which a wholly original copyright 
work can be declared.  That is why OA theories are not applicable to 
copyright.  Yet, there is a moment in which actual copyrighted works are 
born.  It starts when the individual interacts in society with the intention 
to create authorial commodities; the moment when the collective 
contribution is assembled and merged with the individual’s contribution 
into an inseparable unitary whole, capable of ownership.  It cannot be 
the sole moment of the public or the individual; it is either jointly 
constructed and realized or it does not exist at all.  This moment is a 
moment of collaboration between authors and the public—a moment 
dependent on the public authorial role; a moment that reflects the nature 
of authors and original copyrighted entities as social constructions. 
By defending this conclusion I do not mean to announce the “death of 
the author,” but emphasise how original appropriation theories have no 
relevance to discussions on copyright.  Without the public domain, 
without collectively owned social and cultural properties, copyrighted 
works are impossible.  The basic assumption can be formulated in the 
 237. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 349 (1989). 
 238. HARRIS, supra note 48, at 215. 
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negative: there is no support for the rule that copyright works are their 
creator’s novel and sole expressions and hence they should not be 
treated as exclusive private property. 
B.  Where is the Public Domain? 
The public domain is a basic ingredient in the formulation of the 
“copyright moment.”  It “is a subject that divides legislators, corporate 
and individual participants in creative endeavours, practicing lawyers, 
and intellectual property scholars in ways that, I suspect, would astonish 
their counterparts even twenty-five or fifty years ago.”239  It has a place 
of honor in almost every discourse on copyright.240  Litman took up the 
great challenge of defining the public domain.  She argues: “The public 
domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is 
undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the 
system to work by leaving raw material of authorship available for 
authors to use.”241  Similarly, Gordon defines the public domain as a 
source of rights that is “largely filled with creations whose period of 
protection has expired, works which have been abandoned, or works for 
which no protection existed ab initio.”242  In a later article she criticises 
the prevailing definition of the public domain and observes that: 
 239. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One 
View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 301 (2004). 
 240. The concept “public domain” differs from “public interest.” Public domain 
secures public interests. Dreier recently remarked that these concepts are difficult to 
define: 
[W]hile the term “public interest” is often cited, there is a certain vagueness 
inherent in it.  Who is, who represents, the “public”? In some instances, the 
reference is to the “general” public, i.e. to society as a whole.  In other 
instances, the reference is to the interest of a certain subgroup of society: for 
example, end-users, who are viewed as in opposition to the interests of 
rightholders.  Furthermore, the label “public” is sometimes used to mask 
private—often commercial—interests; by the same token, denial of a “public 
interest” can be a mask for unfettered individualistic interests. 
Thomas Dreier, Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside 
of Proprietary Rights?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
295, 297 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). 
 241. Litman, supra note 12, at 968. 
 242. Gordon, supra note 54, at 1559.  On the public domain generally, see Keith 
Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the 
Public Domain: Part I, 18 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (1994); Yochai Benkler, Free as the 
Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and 
the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 




An artist’s relationship to her tradition sometimes involves quotation and 
imitation in ways that implicate copyright law.  That law insufficiently 
recognizes that, because predecessors also built on tradition, the claims that they 
can rightfully assert against the makers of later art should be limited.  Current 
copyright law understates those limits, largely because the law conceives of the 
“public domain” as an area free of obligations.  Under current law, anyone can 
copy from the public domain, and claim copyright in what he has added, 
regardless of whether doing so will impair others’ use of the underlying domain 
that all inherited together.243
Across the chasm, defenders of a robust public domain advocate its 
importance for the workability and stability of the intellectual property 
regime.  Securing authors a steady flow of raw materials in the public 
domain is a key feature in Litman’s argument for a stronger domain.  She 
argues that not only can authors and artists be said to create something 
that is totally original, but that they must not enclose raw materials that 
belong to the common.  Viewing raw materials as belonging to the public 
domain, but then excluding the public from accessing them once fixed in 
a copyrighted entity, is simply to maintain the status quo of the denial of 
the authorial collectivity.  To this one should add the difficulties in 
separating unprotectable raw materials, ideas and facts, for example, 
from protectable materials.  Litman recognises the danger in failing to 
appreciate the true meaning of the public domain. 
Because copyright’s paradigm of authorship credits the author with 
bringing something wholly new into the world, it sometimes fails to 
account for the raw material that all authors use.  This tendency can 
distort our understanding of the interaction between copyright law and 
authorship.  Specifically, it can lead us to give short shrift to the public 
domain by failing to appreciate that the public domain is the law’s 
primary safeguard of the raw material that makes authorship possible.244
Should we take raw materials as the essence of the public domain?  Is 
the public domain, as Cohen perceives it, “a repository of old and 
archetypal content” which marks the “end of a cultural good’s productive 
life” or an entity that “encompass[es] a rich and varied assortment of 
intellectual and cultural building blocks, and holds [those] resources . . . as 
important catalysts for creative ferment”?245  A crucial feature in my 
argument is the fundamental need to preserve not only raw materials but 
(2003); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, 
and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992); Cohen, supra note 16, at 367-70; 
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); 
Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV 183 
(2004); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property 
Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002); and Zimmerman, supra note 239. 
 243. Gordon, supra note 6, at 78. 
 244. Litman, supra note 12, at 967. 
 245. Cohen, supra note 16, at 367-68. 
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end products as well.  The evolved social reality should be saved for 
other members of the public to consume and make use.  It seems that for 
Litman, Gordon, and Cohen, raw materials might suffice. Litman 
mentions the term “raw material” ten times in her article and recognises 
that raw materials are value-laden, remarking that “when the author 
mines the raw material for her next work, significant portions of it will 
be the stuff of the outside world mediated by her experience.  It is 
unsurprising, then, that parts of her work will echo the works of 
others.”246  Her argument supports my claim that copyright scholars, 
although not explicitly, are aware of the sociality of copyright, that 
subjects of copyright are dependent on the authorial collectivity and that 
they are social constructions; that every idea “that is debated, assessed, 
applied, and developed, is situated in a social setting,”247 and that the 
same holds for the object. 
Litman’s assertion that “the term ‘public domain’ has fallen out of 
fashion” is “the public’s price for the grant of copyright” is a main cause 
for concern.248   Her definition of the public domain has had a pioneering 
effect, but her concentration on the availability of raw materials is 
misleading.  In view of my examination of the role of the authorial 
collectivity and subjects of copyright as social constructs, we should 
reject the notion that the rights of the public pertain to the preservation 
of raw materials and unprotectable elements.  By virtue of its authorial 
contribution, the public should have a right to have reasonable access, to 
enjoy and exploit its contribution. 
Even a recent attempt to redefine the public domain leaves the status 
quo practically unchanged.  Diane Zimmerman advocates a “mandatory 
public domain” in which the main theme is that “what goes into [the 
public domain] must stay there.”249  True, she highlights many of the 
greatest flaws in the current copyright reality and recognises the criticism 
that her view may generate: 
Some will find the theory here an insufficiently radical view of the public 
domain because, although it captures much of our common sense intuition about 
how the free availability of speech goods intersects with our ability to 
communicate, it does not necessarily guarantee us a “perfect” public domain 
from their policy perspective.  Others may find it radical because of the idea 
 246. Litman, supra note 12, at 1010-11. 
 247. HACKING, supra note 36, at 125. 
 248. Litman, supra note 12, at 995, 1013. 
 249. Zimmerman, supra note 239, at 372. 




that there is an absolute limit on what can be subjected to intellectual property 
regimes.250
However, it seems that Zimmerman simply favors elevating the status 
of the term “public domain” to that of a constitutional guarantee251 and 
does not address the wrong in treating the public as a graveyard for 
unprotectable materials, or a warehouse for unwanted goods. 
Viewing the public domain as such conveys the feeling that that we, 
the copyright community, insist on nurturing a misconception about 
where the public domain is and what the public domain is.  In this 
Article I attempt to refute this misconception.  The public domain is us.  
It belongs to and is maintained by us—the collective.  It takes part in the 
formation of every copyrighted entity.  In fact, the entity is unattainable 
unless the public domain contributes to its formation.  The public domain is 
the initiator of copyrighted endeavors.  It is the treasury of elements, 
which together trigger the creative impulse.  It is also a social construction, 
as it is constantly being reinvented and enhanced by historical events 
and social processes. 
There is no public domain for copyright works only.  It is a fiction to 
devise a domain in which only unusable or unprotectable copyrighted 
entities reside.  The public domain in copyright cannot exist independent of 
the larger social domain.  For the most part, it is definable as a subcategory 
within the larger social public domain, an entity that accommodates the 
specific needs of artists, authors, and the like.  This view of the public 
domain does not deny authors’ and artists’ rights, but rather highlights 
the truth of the construction of authorship and copyright creation and the 
fundamental mistake in our constant denial of the public interest and its 
contribution. 
Boyle suggests that we “need to invent the public domain in order to 
call into being the coalition that might protect it.”252  The public domain 
as a concept and as an entity is already here.  It is well ingrained in 
discourses on copyright.  The coalition is us.  Before we devise a way to 
reinvent the public domain, or make it mandatory,253 we have to modify 
our one-way attitude toward what an author is and how works of 
authorship and art are created.  Only then can we understand the 
 250. Id. at 373. 
 251. Zimmerman writes: “If a constitutional basis for recognizing some form of 
‘mandatory public domain,’ particularly one that reaches both federal and state activity, 
is plausible, its recognition would bring order to sprawl in intellectual property rights, 
and stabilize the balance between incentives and access along more intelligible lines.”  
Id. at 311-12. 
 252. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the 
Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 113 (1997). 
 253. Zimmerman, supra note 239, at 370-74. 
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implications of the dependence on the authorial collectivity and the 
social construction paradigm, and form the coalition that will truly 
protect the public domain.  Moreover, if “every viable society must 
develop procedures of reality-maintenance,”254 then our copyright law 
ought to promote a robust public domain and preserve the collective 
nature of its properties. 
C.  Authors as Collaborators   
1.  The Conceptual Wrong in Individualistic Collaboration 
In The Construction of Authorship, Woodmansee and Jaszi invite 
readers to realize the true meaning of authorial creation.  They argue that 
“[m]ost writing today—in business, government, industry, the law, the 
sciences and social sciences—is collaborative, yet it is still being taught 
as if it were a solitary, originary activity.”255  While Woodmansee 
examines the evolution of “authorship” as a concept,256 Jaszi argues that 
as the authorial creative process becomes increasingly collaborative and 
collective, traditional copyright laws become ineffective because they 
deny copyright’s social objectives.  In particular, conceptions of Romantic 
authorship become more insistent.257  This is where Woodmansee and 
Jaszi and I agree.  Their attempt to reconstruct authors and authorship is 
imperative for every discussion on copyright.  As already argued, it is, 
however, somewhat individualistic, as it deals with collaboration between 
individuals and not between individuals and the public at large.258  
Collaborative authorship can be viewed as either individualistic or 
collective but in copyright they operate simultaneously. 
 254. BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 120, at 147. 
 255. Introduction, supra note 8, at 9; see also Jaszi, supra note 32, at 25. 
 256. See Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 8, at 15-28; see also Martha Woodmansee, 
The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 
“Author,” 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984). 
 257. See Jaszi, supra note 32, at 29, 56; see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of 
Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455.  On the 
deconstruction of the Romantic author, see Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and 
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 
(1996); and Ryan Littrell, Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright 
Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2001). 
 258. Kaplan also remarks that much “intellectual work including the distinctively 
imaginative is now being done by teams, a practice apt to continue and grow” and that 
“may diffuse and diminish emotions of original discovery and exclusive ownership.”  
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 117 (1967). 




Although Woodmansee and Jaszi successfully explain the anatomy of 
authorship and consider fundamental limits to authorial rights for a 
stronger public domain, they still place individual authors at the 
vanguard.  They consider collaboration to be the paradigm of relations 
between an author and other fellow authors or partners in their individual 
capacity.  They embrace the argument that “[a]ny frank appraisal of 
authorship must conclude that each author’s work contains both the 
author’s original creations and material drawn from other authors.”259  
But what about the reliance on the public?  Is the “copyright moment” 
the moment of individuals only?  Is it not a moment which signifies the 
sociality of copyright—the collaboration between authors and the 
general public?  It would be wrong to say that Woodmansee and Jaszi 
ignored the sociality of copyright or neglected the role of the public 
domain in the copyright creation process.  However, their emphasis on 
collaboration between individuals is misleading.  In other words, while 
they enquire into the construction of authorship and authorial works, I 
argue that we ought to examine the social construction as well. 
2.  Believing in the Author 
Woodmansee informs us that the definition of the author and of 
authorship has been the subject of transformation and synthesis for 
centuries.  For example, in the thirteenth century there were four ways of 
making a book, none of which correspond to any notion of sole 
authorship. “In the Renaissance . . . the ‘author’ was an unstable marriage of 
two distinct concepts.  He was first and foremost a craftsman,” and was 
also inspired by the muses or God.260  Woodmansee claims that the idea 
that “the writer is a special participant in the production process—the 
only one worthy of attention—is of recent provenience.  It is a by-
product of the Romantic notion that significant writers break altogether 
with tradition to create something utterly new, unique—in a word, 
‘original.’”261  Similarly, Rose examines the idea of the author and 
originality in its historical context and writes that  
copyright—the practice of securing marketable rights in texts that are treated as 
commodities—is a specifically modern institution, the creature of the printing 
press, the individualization of authorship in the late Middle Ages and early 
 259. Yen, supra note 14, at 166; see also Litman, supra note 12, at 1010-11. 
 260. MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET 36 (1994).  See 
generally id. at 34-56. 
 261. Woodmansee, supra note 256, at 16. 
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Renaissance, and the development of the advanced marketplace society in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.262   
What Woodmansee and Rose implicitly tell us is that they would 
accept Hacking’s argument that the author as a kind of person is a social 
construction—a contingent upshot of historical events and social 
processes.  Like many others, however, they do not explain how to make 
use of this insight to change existing ownership patterns in copyright and 
they still consider collaboration an activity between individuals.  My 
intention in this Article is to highlight the inherent paradox in arguments 
supporting the sociality of copyright but at the same time examining it 
from an individualistic perspective. 
Although a social construction, an author exercises subjective judgment 
and breathes life into new ideas embedded in eventual products.263  He 
applies Wallas’s four-step test while creating copyrighted materials.264  
He shares with the world his exclusive property in elements that 
constitute his original makeup—elements without which the authorial 
act would not have existed.  The individual is essentially the proprietor 
of his own person and innate capacities and he therefore has a valid 
claim for ownership over authorial products he creates.  The author uses 
his qualities and capacities to comprehend, then translate and modify 
collectively owned cultural and social properties.  If authorial products 
were premised on the author’s contribution or subjective experiences 
only “it would be impossible either to have a direct intercourse with the 
work or to know it.”265
Michel Foucault’s answer to the question, “What is an author?” supports 
the social construction argument.266  He informs us that an author is an 
 262. ROSE, supra note 25, at 3; see also 1 ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING 
PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE (1979). 
 263. For Jane Ginsburg, an author “succeeds in exercising minimal personal 
autonomy in her fashioning of the work.”  Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship 
in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1092 (2003) (emphasis 
added).  The act of authorial creation is a process in which no player can act alone. 
Products resulting from this activity signify exercise of “minimal personal autonomy” 
only.  The law does not consider the level of autonomy exercised for matters of copyright 
entitlement.  In fact, the law substitutes “minimal” with “optimal” and considers authors 
as creators of wholly new substances. 
 264. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 265. ROMAN INGARDEN, THE COGNITION OF THE LITERARY WORK OF ART 13-14 
(Ruth Ann Crowley & Kenneth R. Olson trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1973) (1968), 
cited in Palmer, supra note 35, at 845. 
 266. Michel Foucault, What is an Author? (Josué V. Harari trans., 1979), in THE 
FOUCAULT READER 101 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984); cf. SEÁN BURKE, THE DEATH AND 




ideological figure and that it is “worth examining how the author 
became individualized in a culture like ours.”267  Foucault erodes the 
concept of the individual writer by referring to “the author function” and 
claims this is a historical variable.  He then denies that the author is the 
originator of a text having its own meaning and value and considers the 
author to be a social construct: “this author function does not develop 
spontaneously as the attribution of a discourse to an individual. It is, 
rather, the result of a complex operation which constructs a certain 
rational being that we call ‘author.’”268  The author—“this intelligible 
being”269—gets its realistic form from us: 
[T]hese aspects of an individual which we designate as making him an author 
are only a projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations 
that we force texts to undergo, the connections that we make, the traits that we 
establish as pertinent, the continuities that we recognize, or the exclusions that 
we practice.270
And although terms change and conceptions take different directions at 
different times, “we can find through the ages certain constants in the 
rules of author construction.”271
Roland Barthes announces the “Death of the Author” and, like 
Foucault, rips from the author certain powers and identity.  Romantic 
authorship stipulates that a literary work or a work of art has a single 
true interpretation that its author conveys.  Barthes challenges this idea: 
“We now know that a text is not a line of words releasing a single 
‘theological’ meaning . . . but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety 
of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.”272  Although many 
copyright scholars would support similar views, there is still a need for a 
wider understanding of Foucault, or similar approaches.  As Woodmansee 
and Jaszi assert: 
However enthusiastically legal scholars may have thrown themselves into 
“deconstructing” other bodies of legal doctrine, copyright has remained 
untouched by the implications of the Derridean proposition that the inherent 
instability of meaning derives not from authorial subjectivity but from 
intertextuality.  Above all, the questions posed by Michel Foucault in “What Is an 
Author?” about the causes and consequences of the persistent, overdetermined 
power of the author construct—with their immediate significance for law—have 
RETURN OF THE AUTHOR: CRITICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY IN BARTHES, FOUCAULT AND 
DERRIDA 93 (Edinburgh Univ. Press 2d ed. 1998). 
 267. Foucault, supra note 266. 
 268. Id. at 110. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. (emphasis added). 
 271. Id. 
 272. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE MUSIC TEXT 142, 146 
(Stephen Heath trans., Noonday Press ed. 1988) (1977).
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gone largely unattended by theorists of copyright law, to say nothing of 
practitioners or, most critically, judges and legislators.273
I distance my approach from Foucault and Barthes, and position 
myself somewhere between their approaches and that of the scholars I 
criticise in this Article. For the former, the copyright moment is a 
fiction; for the latter it should be modified but not necessarily in a 
radical manner.  Neither side portrays the conception of authorship that I 
envision.  I fully support applying social constructionism to authors and 
their creative expressions, but I do not strip them of their contribution. 
For the same reasons that a copyrighted work cannot be created without 
the public’s contribution, it cannot be realized without the individual’s 
input. This is why we should endorse reconstruction of the “copyright 
moment,” a moment in which the public and author join together and 
create an enterprise of social wealth for which both deserve a reward. 
IX.  “REVISION” AS A LABEL 
The above discussion on the role of the authorial collectivity and the 
social construction of authors and their creations stipulates that many 
terms might be possible candidates for a more suitable label to characterize 
the “copyright moment”: for example, “imitation” or “repetition.”274  St. 
Bonaventura, writing in the thirteenth century, identifies four different 
ways to “make” a book: as a “scriptor,” “compiler,” “commentator,” and 
as an “auctor”: 
A man might write the works of others, adding and changing nothing, in which 
case he is simply called a ‘scribe’ (scriptor).  Another writes the works of others 
with additions which are not his own; and he is called ‘compiler’ (compilator).  
Another writes both others’ work and his own, but with others’ work in 
principal place, adding his own for purposes of explanation; and he is called 
‘commentator’ (commentator). . . . Another writes both his own work and others’ 
 273. Introduction, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
 274. One repeats his predecessors, but in a way that adds a new dimension and 
hence results in a new work.  In his criticism on the notion of creativity, Osborne 
remarks that works of art involve repetition. 
Not repetition of the same object or specific theme necessarily, but repetition 
of the same activity, repetition in the name not just of seeking an answer to 
something but of locating, deepening, embellishing a problem: in painting, 
Chardin’s repeated focusing on a few grapes, Giorgio Morandi’s endless little 
bottles arranged and re-arranged on a shelf . . . . 
Thomas Osborne, ‘Against Creativity’: A Philistine Rant, 32 ECON. & SOC’Y 507, 520 
(2003). 




but with his own work in principal place adding others’ for purposes of 
confirmation; and such a man should be called an ‘author’ (auctor).275
In this definition there is one word that is mentioned four times: “other.”  
Even the most elevated entity in the hierarchy—“author”—produces only 
in a collaborative manner.  To St. Bonaventura’s four possibilities I 
should add the terms: “translator,” “communicator,” and “selector.”  For 
Durham, authorship is about communication.  It is first “an act of 
selection from an array of alternatives . . . .”276  He offers a model of 
authorship based on information theory and contends that in the 
information society, just as the principles of information theory 
stipulates all forms of communication, “works of authorship are, by and 
large, communicative . . . .”277
Another possible label for the “copyright moment” is “revision.”  In 
Revision and Romatic Authorship, Zachary Leader rejects the Romantic 
notions of authors and poets as solitary geniuses.278  Leader takes the 
revision rather than the original drafting of authorial works as the 
organising principle of his work.  He claims that 
the writing of the Romantic period (as of all periods) is the product of a 
network of literary and social relations, one in which the nominal author’s 
contribution and authority are dominant but not exclusive.  Even when fiercely 
professing independence, the author typically draws on a range of personal and 
institutional collaborators, including family, friends, publishers, reviewers, and 
readers.279
Although Leader does not take the initial creative process as the 
paradigm of his analysis, he rejects any Romantic understanding of 
subsequent revisions as a solitary artistic expression and questions the 
credibility of the Romantic view of poetry as the result of a spontaneous 
and illogical process.  In defense of his argument, Leader uses examples 
of prose and poetry by Wordsworth, Byron, and Coleridge, Shelley’s 
novel Frankenstein, and John Clare’s poems revised by his publisher 
John Taylor, the poet Keats, and others. 
Leader does not randomly choose Coleridge as a case study.  
Coleridge had a clear conception of authorship, which excludes external 
 275. EINSTEIN, supra note 262, at 121-22, cited in Woodmansee, On the Author 
Effect: Recovering Collectivity, supra note 256, at 17. 
 276. Alan L. Durham, Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Alternative 
Model of “Authorship,” 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73. 
 277. Id. at 72.  He remarks: “In important respects, an unromantic, selection-based 
model of authorship would parallel contemporary literary theory.  It would focus 
attention on the work rather than the author. Originality would be characteristic of the 
text—or, more precisely, of the text in context of the available alternatives—just as 
information is a characteristic of a message, not of the message sender.”  Id. at 119. 
 278. ZACHARY LEADER, REVISION AND ROMANTIC AUTHORSHIP (1996). 
 279. Id. at 15 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
ZEMER 8-8-06.DOC 9/6/2006  1:59 PM 
[VOL. 43:  247, 2006]  The Copyright Moment 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 315 
 
stimuli or social contributions. Many contemporary authors would 
identify themselves with this view and get the support of copyright law 
in enforcing it.  Sonia Hofkosh observes that Coleridge held a decidedly 
subjective view of authorship and authorial rights: “the rationale regarding 
the author’s natural right to own and to profit from his literary labour 
registers the stake the writer has in choosing “‘what an author means’ 
‘for himself.’”280  Hofkosh continues and remarks that 
Authorship in Coleridge’s ideal description enacts a self-fulfilling economy, an 
organic circulation, in which value accrues to individuality within a naturally 
closed system without substantial change or exchange: no risk, no excess, 
nothing for which the author cannot himself account. 
   Literary property is in this way crucially distinguished from “all other property,” 
and the author from “ribbon-weavers, calico-printers, cabinet-makers, and 
china-manufacturers” insofar as what the author produces is the inalienable 
stuff of his own subjectivity.281
For Leader “the prose method itself implies the impossibility of 
ever controlling one’s words, or freeing oneself from others’ words, 
an impossibility that helps to account for Coleridge’s obsessive 
revisions . . . .”282  He observes a “distinction between internally imposed 
revisions, whether a product of unconscious compulsions or matters of 
conscious conviction, and revisions of external origin, involving the 
writer’s personal and institutional affiliations. . . .  Wordsworth and 
Coleridge revised in response to external as well as internal pressures, 
as did Keats and Clare.”283  Elsewhere in the work, he forcefully asserts 
that Coleridge’s poems “directly question the autonomy of the self, 
language, ‘possession’ (that is, the ‘owning’ or authorship of one’s 
writing).”284
Leader’s study reveals the flaws inherent in contemporary approaches 
to copyright that sanctify the individual author.  The author, even when 
revising his work, does not create alone; he does not simply use his 
innate abilities, creative personality, and talent and creates something 
new that did not exist before.  Indeed, Leader closes his work with this 
 280. SONIA HOFKOSH, SEXUAL POLITICS AND THE ROMANTIC AUTHOR 15 (1998). 
 281. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Leader argues that Coleridge’s 
concept of a stable text by his continuous revising suggests that “the perfect poem was a 
chimera and that authority itself was therefore a fiction. He may, that is to say, have 
been . . . a deconstructionist.” LEADER, supra note 278, at 113; see also WEISBERG,  
supra note 126, at 46. 
 282. LEADER, supra note 278, at 136. 
 283. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 284. Id. at 137. 




revealing statement: “What studying such revision reveals is the 
inadequacy or incompleteness of the Romantic view: none of the writers 
discussed in this book fits the stereotype most of them helped construct.  
The spontaneous, extemporizing, otherworldly, autonomous author, the 
Romantic author, is a fiction much in need of revision . . . .”285  Throughout 
his study he never devalues the fact that a vital source of poetic 
inspiration is external stimuli, social and cultural ideals and collectively 
created and owned properties, and reminds us that even authorial revision is 
not a solitary activity.  It “derives in part from external sources, is a 
‘collaborative’ enterprise involving not only friends and publishers. . . but 
the public itself. . . .”286
X.  CONCLUSION 
In her introduction to the 2005 edition of The Best American Essays, 
Susan Orlean reminded me of the reason why I wrote this Article—the 
reason why we need talk more about the social nature of copyright.   She 
tries to define “what an essay is—what makes up the essential parts and 
structure of the form.”287   It seems as if she is having a conversation with 
Foucault, explaining to him why his definition of who is an author is 
incomplete, for it does not consider the significance of the subjectivity of 
the author.  For Orlean, essays are conversations, and can “range in 
content, tone, structure, and approach.  It’s a loose construct,” and what 
moves her most “is an essay in which the writer turns something over 
and over in his or her head, and in examining it finds a bit of truth about 
human nature and life and the experience of inhabiting this planet.”288  I 
agree with this statement.  However, in order for an author to turn 
something over and over in his head, he needs the collective; he needs 
the contribution the public makes to the copyright making process; he 
has no choice but to collaborate with the public because his innate 
abilities are limited.  They need to be transformed.  That is why the 
“copyright moment” is not the moment of the lone author. 
Scholarship on copyright strives to find the appropriate balance 
between private rights and public interest in copyright.  Any attempt to 
redefine copyright in order to secure a stable intellectual culture will 
mature and have a real impact on the evolution of copyright only if we, 
the copyright community, will be willing to accept that the “copyright 
moment” is the moment in which we all share responsibility; it is a 
 285. Id. at 315. 
 286. Id. at 263 (emphasis added). 
 287. Susan Orlean, Introduction, in THE BEST AMERICAN ESSAYS 2005, at xv, xvi 
(Susan Orlean ed., 2005). 
 288. Id. at xvi-xvii. 
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moment in which one or more individuals collaborate with the collective.   
We are, after all, Lockean “sociable Creature[s].”289
I believe that theoretical inquiries into how to redefine copyright 
necessitate express, rather than silent, agreements: First, that authors and 
their creative works are social constructions; and second, that the main 
implication emanating from this agreement is that copyrighted entities 
are collective properties.  Allocation of rights to enjoy and exploit and 
duties to respect will only then become meaningful and lasting for both 
authors and public. 
This Article shows that our contemporary concept of copyright 
incorporates a fantasy.  It is a fantasy about authors and their unlimited 
creative abilities.  It is a fantasy that legal systems embrace and cherish. 
Copyright laws act increasingly as laws of exclusion.  They allow certain 
individuals to possess economic power and knowledge over what are in 
fact collective products. The “copyright moment” suggests that, if copyright 
means anything, it means a principle that defines the mutual commitment 
authors and the public have undertaken, namely, to preserve and jointly 
enrich our social domain and dialogic culture.  It is a principle that 
regulates ownership and control of cultural and social resources resulting 


















 289. ESSAY, supra note 154, bk. III, ch. I, § 1. 
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